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BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment and order of the Third 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)0) (West 2004). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is the latest chapter in a longstanding dispute over whether the public can 
access the northern end of Stansbury Island, located at the southwestern edge of the Great 
Salt Lake, on roads that have existed since at least the 1950s.1 
Appellants have owned various parcels of property there over the years. As a 
means to prevent the public from trespassing on their land, Appellants petitioned the 
Tooele County Commission in early 1993 to "abandon any interest which the county may 
have" in the West Stansbury Road (R.1975)-the only access road to the northern end of 
the Island-which enters Six Mile Ranch property beginning at the south line of section 
16. See Illustration One, infra , at 8. 
Tooele County mailed statutorily required written notice of its intent to vacate its 
interest in the road to all abutting landowners, but not to the State of Utah. Thereafter, 
Tooele County enacted Ordinance 93-9, vacating whatever interest it had in the West 
Stansbury Road. Appellants then placed a locked gate across West Stansbury Road 
where, going northward, it enters their property. This action denied access not only to the 
public but also to other landowners on the northern end of the Island, including the State. 
The State of Utah, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands (State) challenged 
Ordinance 93-9 as invalid because the county did not comply with the notice 
'The case background is taken from the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State 
Division of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680, 
unless otherwise indicated. 
2 
requirements of former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-102.3 and -102.4 (Supp. 1993)2 by 
mailing the State, an abutting landowner of record, written notice of its intent to vacate its 
interest in the road. The trial court ruled against the State, upheld the ordinance, and 
awarded summary judgment to the Bleazards and Six Mile Ranch. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court overturned the trial court, holding that the 
State was statutorily entitled under former section 27-12-102.4 to written notice by mail 
of the county's proposal to vacate the West Stansbury Road if the road abuts the State's 
lands at the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. State Division of Forestry, Fire & State 
Lands v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, If 24, 44 P.3d 680. "[Ljand that joins, borders or 
bounds a county road proposed to be vacated . . . is considered to be land that cabut[s] the 
county road9 under section 27-12-102.4." Id. at j^ 20. The Court remanded the case for a 
determination of whether the State's land abuts West Stansbury Road "as it is described 
in the County's proposed vacation notice and subsequent enactment of that proposal." Id. 
at % 25.3 If so, the trial court was directed to enter summary judgment for the State, 
nullifying Ordinance 93-9. Id. 
On remand, Tooele County and Appellants conceded that the West Stansbury Road 
abutted the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, where the State's sovereign lands begin 
2The current provision is Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-108 (West 2004). 
3The legal description in the county's notice described the road proposed to be 
vacated as going north through Section 9 of Township 2 North, i.e., to the meander line at 
the dike. See R. 94, 107; see also Ordinance 93-9 (R.82-83); Illustration One, infra, at 8. 
3 
(R.620 at 1, 15). Judge Randall N. Skanchy rejected Appellants' contention that he was 
required to decide on remand whether the road that the county described in its notice was 
"public" all the way to that meander line. (R.620 at 37-38). He also rejected their 
argument that Tooele County's Ordinance 93-9 was valid, notwithstanding the lack of 
mailed notice to the State, because the State purportedly had actual notice of the county's 
intent to vacate its interest in the West Stansbury Road. {Id.). Based on these rulings, the 
trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Utah and entered an 
order invalidating Ordinance 93-9 (R.583-4). 
A three-day trial was then held to resolve the State's remaining claims that the 
West Stansbury Road and three side roads were dedicated to public use under Utah Code 
Ann. § 72-5-104 (1) (West 2004), which provides: "A highway is dedicated and 
abandoned to the use of the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period often years." The trial court ultimately concluded that the West 
Stansbury Road had been dedicated to the public, but that the three side roads at issue had 
not. (Addendum 1, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law). 
The Bleazards and Six Mile Ranch timely appealed the trial court's ruling as to the 
West Stansbury Road. The Utah Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands timely cross-
appealed the trial court's rulings as to two of the side roads, referred to as the Pass 
Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Given its unchallenged findings that the general public could come and go on 
the West Stansbury Road at its convenience for a variety of public recreational and other 
purposes from 1949 to 1993, did the trial court correctly conclude that the road was 
continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years and, therefore, dedicated to the 
public under section 72-5-104 (1)? 
The trial court's ultimate determination of public dedication of a road under Utah 
statute, which is a mixed question of fact and law, is reviewed for correctness. Heber 
City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1997). However, the appellate court 
gives significant discretion to the trial court in its application of the facts to the governing 
dedication statute because of the "highly fact dependent" nature of the determination. Id. 
at 310. 
2. Did the trial court correctly conclude that the decision in State v. Tooele County 
did not require it to determine whether the road, which the county in its notice proposed 
to vacate to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake at the north dike, was "public" all the 
way to that point? 
The determination of whether the trial court correctly interpreted State v. Tooele 
County is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
2003 UT 51, H56, 82 P.3d 1076, 1089. 
5 
3. Did the trial court correctly conclude that actual notice by the State would not 
comply with the statutory requirement of mailed notice to abutting landowners in former 
section 27-12-102.4? 
Whether actual notice satisfies the requirements of a statute is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. See Gallegos ex rel. Rynes v. Dick Simon Trucking, Inc., 2004 
UT App 322, U 8, 110 P.3d 710, 713. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
4. With regard to the unsigned and ungated side roads used by the public since the 
early 1950s, did the trial court erroneously add requirements to the public dedication 
statute, section 72-5-104(1), contrary to Heber City, 942 P.2d at 312-13? 
The trial court's ultimate determination of whether a road has been publically 
dedicated, a mixed question of law and fact, is reviewed for correctness; however, the 
trial court is granted significant discretion in applying the facts found to the governing 
statute. Id. at 309. This issue arose from the trial court's judgment and, thus, was not 
separately preserved. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, ffif 16-17, 2 P.3d 442. 
5. In any event, do the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact concerning 
unfettered and continuous use of the side roads as public thoroughfares for more than ten 
years prior to 1977, the earliest Appellants acquired any interest in lands adjacent to the 
side roads, establish their public dedication as a matter of law under section 72-5-104(1)? 
The trial court's ultimate determination of whether a road has been publically 
dedicated, a mixed question of law and fact, is reviewed for correctness; however, the 
6 
trial court is granted significant discretion in applying the facts found to the governing 
statute. Heber City, 942 P.2d at 309. This issue arose from the trial court's judgment and 
thus, was not separately preserved. See Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 45, ^  16-17, 2 
P.3d442. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the determinative statutes, section 72-5-104 (1) and former section 27-
12-102.4, appears in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
West Stansbury Road 
The West Stansbury Road is a graded, gravel highway beginning from the south 
line of Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele Co., Utah, and 
terminating at the USMagnesium ("USMag") gate on the dike at the north end of 
Stansbury Island (R.1142, Finding 1). See Illustration One, infra at 8. It traverses state 
lands at the meander line in Section 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele 
Co., Utah, immediately in front of the USMag dike (R.l 142, Finding 2; R.l 150 at 273, 
277-78). 
The West Stansbury Road has existed in some form since 1915, was improved in 
1949-50, and was later extended to the USMag dike in approximately 1965 (R. 1980-1, 
1988, P-20, P-21, P-29; R.l 149 at 150-51; R.l 150 at 300, 353; R.1984, P-24). 
Through 1987, ownership of land over which the West Stansbury Road traversed 
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Range 6 West, SLM; J. J. Castagno, his wife Edith, and their descendants, Glen and 
Rhea Castagno and David Castagno, owned portions in Section 4 of Township 1 North, 
Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele Co., Utah, and Sections 32, 29 and 16 of Township 2 North, 
Range 6 West, SLM (R.2005, P-46); Reese Richmond and Amoco Oil Company owned 
small portions of the road in Sections 32 and 20 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, 
SLM, Tooele Co., Utah (R.2008, P-49); the Cook family owned a portion of the land at 
Section 20 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele Co., Utah (R.2007, P-48); 
US Mag owned a portion of the land at the far end of the Island in Sections 16 and 9 of 
Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele Co., Utah (R.l 149 at 136). See 
Illustration One, supra, at 8. 
The West Stansbury Road was designated a Class B road to USMag's gate by the 
State of Utah and supported by the Tooele County Commission from 1954 through 1993 
(R.l 140, Finding 7; R.2014, P-55A, D-I; R.l 149 at 84-96). Tooele County received state 
funding for the entire road during these forty years (R.l 140, Finding 8; R.l 149 at 82-89). 
A Class B road must be open to the public, without gates or restrictions, and approved by 
the County Commission as a public road (R.l 149 at 73-76, 83, 86, 91-92). Private roads 
are excluded and are not eligible for funds (R.l 149 at 91-92). 
Tooele County Road Department employees maintained the road by grading it two 
to three times every year from 1954 to 1993 (R.l 139, Finding 17; R.l 149 at 106-08, 114, 
185, 188; R.l 150 at 244, 263; R.l 151 at 432). The county maintained the road to the dike 
gate (R.l 149 at 106, 108; R.l507-12, Floyd White Affidavit). 
9 
There have been no gates, physical restrictions or impediments to the public using 
the road all the way to the gate at the dike. (R.l 134, Finding 42; R.l 149 at 193; R.l 150 
at 221, 229, 251, 253, 263, 339). There were no signs indicating the road was private 
(R.l 150 at 383). The only sign ever placed indicating the road's status was a BLM sign, 
placed with permission of the Appellants, telling users not to leave the "county road" 
(R.l976, 1977, P-16, P-17; R.l 150 at 323, 373, 377). A few "No Trespassing" signs 
existed at various periods of time along the main road, although it is not known for what 
periods of time. (R.l 137, Finding 25). 
From 1954 until 1993, the County considered the West Stansbury Road to be a 
public road (R.l 150 at 328; R.2014, P-55; R.l 165-1672, 1765-1794, Leland Hogan and 
Ray Johnson Deposition Transcripts; R.l 149 at 50, 75-76, 83, 86-87, 91). The Cook 
family (R.l 149 at 188-89) and the Castagno family (R.l 150 at 205-7, 253), adjacent 
landowners, considered the road public. Those who knew and worked for Ed Cassity, 
Appellants' grandfather, declared that Cassity believed the road was public and that the 
public had a right to use it. (R.l 149 at 185; R.l 150 at 250, 263; R.l498-1502, Keith 
Wanlass Affidavit). 
Members of the general public also considered the road a public road (R.l 149 at 
49, 109, 177; R.l 150 at 230). They not only used the West Stansbury Road, but also 
surrounding areas off the road, particularly at the northern end of the Island near the Great 
Salt Lake (R.l 137, Finding 24). This usage has been regular since the 1930s, until the 
gate was placed on the road in 1993 by Appellants (Sixty Affidavits Summarized in 
10 
R.2011, P-52).4 Members of the public were also seen on the Island regularly using the 
road (R.l 149 at 58, 111-12, 154, 165-6, 176, 177; R.l 150 at 221, 229, 388; R.l 151 at 
404, 407, 428, 446). 
Members of the public who testified in person or through affidavit never sought 
permission to use the main road (60 Affidavits; R.l 149 at 49, 77, 123, 165, 192; R.l 150 
at 222). These individuals were never stopped or asked to leave the road just for using 
the road (R.l 149 at 45, 77, 123, 177, 180-81; R.l 150 at 222, 229, 263; R.l 151 at 446; 60 
Affidavits). Adjacent owners also did not ask people to leave the road just for using the 
road (Cooks: R.l 149 at 188-89, 195; Castagnos: R.l 149 at 206, 211; Ed Cassity: R.l 150 
at 244, 250, 256, 266; R.l 151 at 447). John Bleazard, who managed Six Mile Ranch only 
since 1977, did not ask people to leave if they were just using the road (R.l 150 at 385. 
386). 
People were asked to leave Appellants' private lands surrounding the road when 
cattle were present, if they had guns around cattle or were shooting on those lands 
(R.l 150 at 244, 256, 266, 297, 358-9, 379, 385; R.l 151 at 412, 438, 446, 449-50; R.1272-
1278, 1498-1502, Durfee, Wanlass Affidavits) or from the road (R.l 150 at 297), or were 
4(R.l 179-1537, Affidavits of: L. D. Anderson, M. R. Anderson, Arbon, E. C. 
Barrus, R. A. Barrus, Bracken, Butler, C. Castagno, Cole, D. A. Cook, P. Cook, R. L. 
Cook, T. Cook, B. Dixon, R. A. Dixon, Durfee, Ekenstam, Evans, Griffith, Gwynn, J. 
Hale, R. Hale, Hammond, G. Henwood, J. W. Henwood, W. H. Henwood, Hoggan, 
Hulett, Hullinger, M. B. Hunt, R. Hunt, Johanson, Kidd, Lawrence, Lemmon, Miles, 
Murray, J. Nelson, M. E. Nelson, M. G. Nelson, Nielson, A. Palmer, K. Palmer, Parry, 
Perry, Ramirez, Russell, K. Rydalch, R. Rydalch, Storrer, Sullivan, Tripp, Wanlass, 
Watson, White, Wilson, Wingfield, Winkelaar, and Young). 
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throwing garbage (R.l 150 at 385-86). Simple use of the road was permitted. (R.l 150 at 
386). 
There were no physical restrictions that would preclude individuals going to the 
dike gate (R.l 149 at 193; R.l 150 at 221, 229, 251, 253, 263, 339; R.1257-59, 1272-78, 
1279-1303, 1316-19, 1369-79, 1492-97, Tony Cook, Charles Durfee, Gene Ekenstam, J. 
Wallace Gwynn, Max B. Hunt, and Bryce Tripp Affidavits). Tony Perry saw people 
drive up to the dike and turn around on "several occasions" (R.l447-51; R.l 149 at 112). 
Others personally used and saw people use the entire road to the dike (R.l364-68, 1396-
1401, 1402-5, 1519-25, Hullinger, Lemmon, Murray, Wingfield Affidavits). Others used 
the entire road covered by the Ordinance. (R. 1183-1518, Affidavits of: Anderson, 
Barrus, Butler, Castagno, B. Dixon, R. Dixon, Griffith Hammond, G. Henwood, J. 
Henwood, W. Henwood, Hulett, Hunt, Johnson, Miles, Nelson, W. Perry, Ramirez, 
Rydalch, Sullivan, Tripp, Wanlass, Watson, and Wilson). Gary Bolinder testified that 
people would go to the dike gate area and he would ask them to leave for safety reasons. 
(R.l 151 at 408). Craig Smith testified that, while he did not go out on the Island as an 
employee of Six Mile Ranch often, he did see people drive past the USMag sign (R.l 151 
at 428, 431). 
Pass Canyon Road 
"The 'Pass Canyon Road' intersects the West Stansbury Road in Section 20, 
Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, Tooele Co., Utah, and heads east toward the 
mountains for approximately three miles." (R.l 132, Finding 54). It crosses private 
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property from the West Stansbury Road and provides access to BLM land on the eastern 
part of the Island (R.l 132, Finding of Fact 55; R.l 149 at 55, 115-16). See Addendum 3. 
The current Pass Canyon Road was built and in use by the early 1950s (R.l 149 at 
184; R.l 150 at 262, 267). By 1959 the road was so well established that an aerial 
photograph of the Island shows the road well defined (R. 1984, P-24, See Addendum 4). 
The road begins on property owned by the Cook family for approximately 1/8 
mile, continues for approximately 1/2 - 3/4 mile on land owned by Appellants, and then 
continues on to BLM land and over the mountain for more than two miles (R.2007, P-48; 
R.l 149 at 187; R.l 150 at 380; R.l 132, Finding 55; R.1984, P-24, P-26, 1978 aerial photo; 
R.2007, P-48). See Addenda 4-6. The BLM considers the Pass Canyon Road an 
important public access to BLM lands (R.l 149 at 119). 
"Public members and governmental employees have used the Pass Canyon Road 
since its construction continuing to 1993, when Appellants installed the gate prohibiting 
access to the West Stansbury Road." (R.l 132, Finding 56). Thirty-seven affidavits with 
attached maps show such usage of the road since the early 1950s.5 There was evidence of 
heavy use of the road for hunting, ATV riding, and other recreational uses. (R.l 149 at 
120, 168). 
5
 See R.l 179-1537, Affidavits of: L. Anderson, M. Anderson, E. Barrus, R. Barrus, 
Butler, D. Cook, P. Cook, R. Cook, T. Cook, Ekenstam, Evans, J. Hale, R. Hale, 
Hammond, G. Henwood, J. Henwood, W. Henwood, Hoggan, Hulett, Hunt, Johanson, 
Lawrence, Miles, Murray, M. Nelson, M.E. Nelson, A. Palmer, K. Palmer, Ramirez, 
Russell, K. Rydalch, R. Rydalch, Storrer, Watson, Wingfield, Winkelaar, and Young. 
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All individuals who testified by affidavit and those who testified in person and had 
used the Pass Canyon Road from the early 1950s through the early 1990s never asked 
permission to use the Pass Canyon Road, were never asked to leave the road, and used the 
road when they wanted, as often as they desired, and for a variety of recreational and 
personal reasons. (See footnote 5; R.l 149 at 45, 49, 77, 123,165, 177, 192, 214; R.l 150 at 
221, 227). Many other members of the public were also seen using the road by witnesses 
(R.l 149 at 55, 120, 124, 210; R.l 150 at 223). 
There were no "No Trespassing" signs located adjacent to or on the Pass Canyon 
Road (R.l 132, Finding 57; R.l 149 at 179, 210). There were no gates (R.l 149 at 179, 
193, 210) or restrictions to the Pass Canyon Road to keep individuals off the road 
(R.l 149 at 179, 193, 196), or to preclude use of the road until approximately 1993, when 
Appellants gated the West Stansbury Road (R.l 150 at 383; R.l976, 1977, P-16, P-17). 
The Cooks, as owners of the first eighth of a mile, considered the road public and 
allowed the public free access to the road at any time (R.l 149 at 188, 189, 196). Robert 
Cook testified that "it was open to everybody. There was [sic] no restrictions." (R.l 149 
at 196). The BLM, as owner of the eastern two miles of the road, considered the road a 
public one, over which the public could travel at will (R.l 149 at 118, 131). Ed Cassity, 
owner of the middle three-quarters of a mile, also considered the Pass Canyon Road a 
public road (R.l 150 at 251). Richard Castagno, who worked for Cassity part time from 
the time he was eight years old in 1948-49, and who worked full time with Cassity from 
1957 and for many years thereafter (R.l 150 at 247-48) testified: "It was accessible to 
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anybody." (R.l 150 at 251). "He [Cassity] always assumed that the public had a right to 
be there . . . . " (Id). Doug Castagno, who also worked for Cassity concurred: "We just 
always considered them pretty much public." (R.l 150 at 265). "[T]hey were considered 
open to the public." (Id). 
At no time, before or after 1977, did Six Mile Ranch and Appellants post signs 
saying any road on the Island, either the West Stansbury Road or the side roads, was 
private until 1993. (R.l 150 at 383). On occasion, after he was hired to manage Six Mile 
Ranch in 1977, John Bleazard asked people to leave the Six Mile Ranch portion of the 
road through 1993 (R.l 150 at 311, 325, 371, 380; R.l 151 at 429). Bleazard generally did 
not ask the public to leave unless they were harassing the cattle or were creating 
difficulties. (R.l 150 at 338, 339, 358-59, 385; R.1976, P-16). He often allowed people 
to continue using the road. (R.l 150 at 338-39, 358-59, 385; R.1976, P-16). Bleazard did 
not recall ever kicking people off of the Cook portion of the road (R.l 150 at 381). There 
is no evidence that from 1977 through 1993 any other adjacent landowner asked anyone 
to leave the road. 
Further, there is no evidence that, prior to 1977, anyone was ever asked to leave 
the road by any adjacent landowner (or his agent) just for using the road. Richard 
Castagno, who worked for Ed Cassity for many years prior to 1977, testified: "He never 
threw anybody off anyplace out there." (R.l 150 at 251). He further stated that Cassity 
believed the public had a right to be on the roads and that, while he would like to kick 
people off, he couldn't because they had a right to be there (R.l 150 at 250). Cassity let 
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hunters know that he'd appreciate them going somewhere else, mostly to the south end of 
the Island where they could hunt on public lands. (R.l 150 at 250, 256, 266). If the cows 
were not present, Cassity didn't object to the public being there, regardless of where they 
were (R.l 150 at 266-67). 
Cable Gate Road 
The very northern side road at issue was called the Cable Gate Road for 
convenience of identification at trial because of a cable placed across it in the early 1990s 
(R. 1131, Finding 61) by Appellant John Bleazard on land owned by USMag. (R. 1149 at 
139; R.l976-77, P-16, P-17). USMag removed the cable from its property and reopened 
the road because the company considered the road a public road. (R.l 149 at 139). 
'The 'Cable Gate Road' intersects the West Stansbury Road on the northern end of 
the island, in Section 16, Township 2 North, Range 6 West. . .," traverses through 
Section 9, Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, through Lot 6, and then through lots 
5, 4, and 3 (R. 1131, Finding 60; R. 1964; R. 1984, 1978 aerial photo; R.2007, P-1, P-24, P-
26, and P-48). The road provides access to BLM land and other private property on the 
northern and eastern parts of the Island (R.l 131, Finding 62; R.l 984, 1978 aerial photo, 
P-24, P-26; R.l 150 at 302). See Addenda 4-5. 
When the Cable Gate Road reaches BLM land, the road forks to private lands to 
the northeast and to BLM land to the south as noted in the aerial photos of 1959 (R.l984, 
P-24; R.l978, and P-26) and the official 1968 BLM map. (R.l964, P-l). The BLM 
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considers the Cable Gate Road an important public access to BLM land on the east part of 
the Island. (R.1149 at 119). 
The Cable Gate Road has existed since the early 1950s. (See R.l 149 at 176, 167). 
1959 and 1978 aerial photographs of Stansbury Island show a well developed road that 
had been used for many years. (R. 1984, P-24, P-26,1978 aerial photo). 
Individuals and families used the Cable Gate Road from the early 1950s through 
the closure of the West Stansbury Road in 1993 for recreation and other reasons without 
asking permission, without being asked to leave the road, and when they wanted, as noted 
by forty-six affidavits with maps.6 At least 50% of the time when the BLM representative 
was on the Island, he saw people recreating on the northern part of the Island "either 
camping or running around on motorbikes or ATV's" accessed by the Cable Gate Road. 
(R. 1149 at 121 -122). He saw people using the Cable Gate Road itself. (R. 1149 at 122). 
Other witnesses used the road for family, personal, and group reasons since the 
1950s for many years. (R.l 149 at 167, 176, 230). Many other members of the public 
were seen using the road by witnesses. (R.l 149 at 55, 120, 121, 122, 124, 210; R.l 150 at 
223, 251, Affidavits of Gwynn, Hale, Hullinger, Lemmon, Miles, Murray, W. Perry, T. 
Perry, Sullivan, Tripp, Watson, White; R.l971, P-9). 
6See R.l 179-1537, Affidavits of: L. Anderson, M. Anderson, Arbon, E. Barrus, R. 
Barrus, Bracken, Butler, C. Castagno, Cole, D. Cook, P. Cook, R. Cook, T. Cook, B. 
Dixon, R. Dixon, Durfee, Ekenstam, Evans, Gwynn, J. Hale, R. Hale, Hammond, G. 
Henwood, J. Henwood, W. Hen wood, Hulett, M.. Hunt, R. Hunt, Johanson, Lawrence, 
Lemmon, Miles, Murray, M.E. Nelson, J. Nelson, Nielson, A. Palmer, K. Palmer, Parry, 
K. Rydalch, R. Rydalch, Wanlass, Watson, Wingfield, Winkelaar, and Young. 
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There were no gates or other structures restricting access to the Cable Gate Road 
until the early 1990s when Appellants purchased property that the road traverses. 
(R.l 149 at 122, 179, 196? 206). 
There were no "No Trespassing" signs on the Cable Gate Road or at the beginning 
of the road. {See R.l 137, Finding 25; R.l 149 at 179, 193). Owner David Castagno 
testified that they had never put up any such signs. (R.l 149 at 206). The only sign at or 
near the Cable Gate Road was a USMag sign at its boundary line, aimed at the West 
Stansbury Road to keep people off the dike. (R.l 149 at 140, 152). 
On October 31, 1952, ownership of all property in Section 16, where the road 
begins, was partitioned to J. J. Castagno. (R.2005, P-46; R.l 150 at 290-91; R.l991, P-
32). Section 16 Cable Gate Road property remained in the Castagno family exclusively 
from 1952 until 1987, when David and Rhea Castagno began selling property to the 
Appellants, which they continued to do through October 1991 (R.l997-99, P-38, P-39, P-
40; R.2002, P-43; R. 2003, P-44; R.1996, P-37). 
The second portion of the Gable Gate Road, Lot 6 of Section 9, was purchased by 
USMag's predecessor from the State of Utah in the late 1960s and is currently owned by 
USMag. (R.l 149 at 151; R.l 150 at 287). 
The third section of the Cable Gate Road which crosses Lots 3, 4 and 5 of Section 
9, before it reaches BLM property, was owned by Edward W. Clyde as trustee from the 
late 1940s to 1988. (See R. 1995, P-36). In 1988, Trustee Clyde conveyed legal title to 
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Lots 3, 4, and 5 of Section 9 to the then-beneficial interest holders, Rhea Castagno and 
Irene Price (R.2006, P-47; R.l 149 at 208). 
From 1952 until 1987, Ed Cassity and Appellants had no legal interest or 
ownership in any land that the Cable Gate Road traversed, though John Bleazard testified 
that between 1977 and 1993 he kicked people off the road. (R.l 150 at 325, 371). 
Adjacent landowner USMag and its predecessors considered the Cable Gate Road 
a public road. (R.l 149 at 139). The Castagno family considered the road public and open 
to anyone, with the public being free to go on their property and recreate. (R.l 149 at 196, 
214). David Castagno, the only adjacent landowner before 1987 who testified, did not 
consider the road private and never asked anyone to leave the road or property and never 
stopped those he saw using the road. (R.l 149 at 209, 211). According to Robert Cook, 
the road "was open to everybody. There was [sic] no restrictions." (R.l 149 at 196). 
There is no evidence that Trustee Clyde, Irene Price, or Rhea Castagno ever asked anyone 
to leave their property or the road, or that they considered the road anything but public. 
Rhea Castagno "never told anybody they couldn't use the very north end down there and 
the sand dunes when she owned it, there was no restrictions on ours." (R.l 149 at 196). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is about the right of the public to continue using roads on the northern 
half of Stansbury Island to recreate on public and private lands. Appellee State of Utah 
asks the Court to affirm the trial court's judgment that the West Stansbury Road, the main 
access road to the north end, had been dedicated and abandoned to public use under Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (1). The trial court correctly concluded the public had used the 
entire length of the West Stansbury Road for over forty years, whenever it found it 
convenient or necessary and for a wide variety of recreational purposes, including 
hunting, hiking, horseback riding, biking, picnicking, bird watching and motorcycling. 
This Court should also affirm the trial court's interpretation of the decision in State 
v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680. There, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the 
case, holding that the trial court must invalidate a 1993 Tooele County ordinance vacating 
the public's interest in the West Stansbury Road if the State's land abutted the road; 
which it properly did. The trial court acted properly because in 1993 Tooele County did 
not provide the statutorily-required written notice to the State, an abutting landowner, of 
the pending road vacation proceeding. 
In its cross-appeal, the State of Utah asks this Court to overturn the conclusion of 
the trial court that two side roads, the Pass Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road, were 
not public roads by dedication. Contrary to precedent, the trial court added elements to 
the road dedication statute, section 72-5-104 (1), and made those extra elements 
determinative of the side roads' status. The trial court also erred by disregarding its own 
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findings and the uncontroverted record evidence of decades of continuous public use of 
the side roads before 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE WEST 
STANSBURY ROAD WAS CONTINUOUSLY USED AS A PUBLIC 
THOROUGHFARE FOR TEN YEARS 
Under Section 72-5-104(1), three elements must be proven to support a conclusion 
that a road has been dedicated to the use of the public: (1) continuous use; (2) as a public 
thoroughfare; (3) for a period often years.7 Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310 (interpreting the 
earlier version of the dedication statute, former Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1963)); 
AWINC Corp. v. Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, H 11, 112 P.3d 1228. 
Appellants claim the first two elements have not been satisfied. 
A. The Trial Court's Unchallenged Findings, Including that the Public 
Could Come and Go on the West Stansbury Road at Its Convenience 
from 1949 to 1993, Support the Conclusion that the Ungated Road was 
Continuously Used. 
Appellants first contest the correctness of the trial court's predicate conclusion 
that public use of the West Stansbury Road was continuous. Br. of App. at 17-24. 
7
 An abutting landowner's consent to a public dedication is not required. Heber 
City, 942 P.2d at 311. While early Utah cases also required proof of a landowner's intent 
to dedicate the road to public use, the Utah Supreme Court has abandoned this 
requirement, Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1995); 
Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981). Although a panel of this Court has 
sweepingly stated that the abutting landowners' views of a road's status as public or 
private are "irrelevant" to a determination of whether a road has been dedicated to public 
use, Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 n.3 (Utah App. 1998), this 
appears to be a misreading of prior case law. 
21 
In Campbell v. Box Elder County, this Court held that continuous use of a road 
under the dedication statute occurs "when the public, even though not consisting of a 
great many persons, ma[k]e a continuous and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they [find] 
it convenient or necessary." 962 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, the 
court held that a "mere intermission" is not an interruption of use and the "use may be 
continuous though not constant. . . provided it occurred as often as the claimant had 
occasion or chose to pass." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Appellants do not challenge the thorough findings of fact underpinning the trial 
court's conclusion that the West Stansbury Road was continuously used. Instead, 
Appellants point to purportedly contradictory findings that demonstrate "occasional" 
interruption of the public's use of the road. Br. of App. at 19. The findings cited, 
however, all relate to the Appellants' dealings with individuals trespassing on their 
private lands adjacent to the road, bothering cattle, or shooting guns or throwing garbage 
from the road onto their adjacent private property. {See R.l 137, 1132, Findings 27, 29, 
30-32). None of these findings contradict the court's other findings about the public's use 
of the West Stansbury Road. 
The trial court found, and Appellants do not challenge, numerous other supportive 
factual findings for the trial court's conclusion.8 For instance, trial court found that 
8
 Although Appellants assert that Finding 25 (R. 1137, that the West Stansbury 
Road was not posted with "No Trespassing" signs) is clearly erroneous, Br. of App. at 20-
22, they have failed to marshal the supporting evidence, a prerequisite to demonstrating 
clear error. Thus, this court must assume the finding is supported by the record and 
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"[f]rom 1949 to 1993 the general public used the West Stansbury Road and could 'come 
and go' on the road at will and at times as they chose at their convenience." (R. 1138, 
Finding 21). Appellants likewise do not challenge the trial court's more specific findings 
regarding continuous use, such as: the West Stansbury Road was designated as a Class B 
county road, certifying that it was open to public travel (R. 1139, Finding 16); from 1949 
to 1993, the general public used the West Stansbury Road for numerous recreational 
activities, ranging from picnicking, Easter egg hunts to motorcycling and horseback 
riding (R.l 138, Finding 22); the vast majority of the general public who participated in 
the many recreational activities on the West Stansbury Road did not seek permission from 
anyone to use the road, nor were they asked to leave the road (R.l 138, Finding 23); the 
general public used not only the West Stansbury Road, but also the surrounding areas off 
of the West Stansbury Road on private property, particularly at the northern end of the 
Island near the Great Salt Lake. (R.l 137, Finding 24). 
proceed to review the accuracy of the lower court's legal conclusions. A WINC Corp. v. 
Simonsen, 2005 UT App 168, U 10, 112 P.3d 1228, 1230. 
Appellants also argue that the "No Trespassing" signs, which the trial court found 
referred only to the private lands and not to the West Stansbury Road, should be 
construed as referring to the road as well because they were posted in accordance with the 
Wildlife Resources Code, Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-14(1) (West 2004). Br. of App. at 23-
24. This issue should not be addressed since it is raised for the first time on appeal. State 
v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). In any event, the statute does not apply in 
this case because (i) it was not enacted until 1971, long after the West Stansbury Road 
would have been dedicated to the public; (ii) it applies to landowners seeking to prohibit 
hunting and fishing on their lands and not to whether landowners properly post signs to 
preclude public dedication; and (iii) section 23-20-14(3) carves out an exception for roads 
providing recreational access to sovereign lands. 
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Appellants did not produce one witness who had been denied the ability to "come 
and go" on the road at will and at his convenience. As the trial court's findings reflect, 
Appellants did sometimes remove people from the road adjacent to their property who 
were trespassing or otherwise interfering with their property. Even if these actions show 
"occasional" termination of public use of a portion of the road, they constitute 
insignificant intermissions rather than an interruption in the public's continuous use of the 
road. See Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809; see also Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 
(Utah 1981) (upholding the continuous use of a road despite defendant's occasional 
blocking of the road). Moreover, Appellants' actions do not negate the additional and 
unchallenged findings concerning the public's ability to come and go on the road at its 
convenience from 1949 to 1993, when Appellants first erected a locked gate across the 
road. 
In light of its unchallenged factual findings, the trial court correctly concluded that 
the West Stansbury Road was "continuously used" for purposes of establishing its 
dedication to public use under section 72-5-104(1). See Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310; 
Campbell 962 P.2d at 809. 
B. The West Stansbury Road was a "Public Thoroughfare" Since, for 
More Than Forty Years, the Public had a General Right of Passage 
oyer the Road, not Permissive Use of It. 
Appellants next contest the correctness of the trial court's predicate conclusion 
that the West Stansbury Road was used as a public thoroughfare. Br. of App. at 24-35. 
In Heber City, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[a] 'thoroughfare' is a place or way 
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through which there is passing or travel. It becomes a 'public thoroughfare' when the 
public have a general right of passage." 942 P.2d at 311.9 In public road dedication 
disputes, Utah courts have consistently distinguished use of a road by adjoining property 
owners from its use by the general public. See, e.g., Draper City v. Bernardo, 888 P.2d 
1097, 1099 (Utah 1995); Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1996). Neighboring 
property owners cannot be considered members of the general public because they may 
have documentary or prescriptive rights to use the road, or their use may be by permission 
of the owner. Heber City, 942 P.2d at 312. 
The trial court found that the West Stansbury Road had been used by many and 
different members of the public for over forty years and for a variety of purposes, such as 
hunting, hiking, horseback riding, picnicking, bird watching, motorcycling, and biking.10 
The trial court also found that members of the public used the West Stansbury Road, 
without permission, as a public thoroughfare for over forty years. R.l 142, Finding of 
Fact 4. 
9In Lindsay Land and Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646, 648 (Utah 1930), the 
Court recognized the difficulty in fixing a standard by which to measure what is a public 
use or a public thoroughfare. Yet the Court affirmed public dedication of a road that was 
"used by many and different persons for a variety of purposes" and "open to all who 
desired to use it," use that was "as general and extensive as the situation and surroundings 
would permit, had the road been formally laid out as a public highway by public 
authority." 
10R.l 142, 1138, Findings 4, 22; R.l 149 at 45, 166-67; R.l 150 at 229; Bracken, 
Delbert Cook, Peggy Cook, Durfee, Ekenstam, Lemmon, Wanless and other affidavits as 
noted above in footnote 4. 
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Appellants disagree with the court's findings, claiming that many users of the road 
were permissive users and, therefore, not members of the public. Br. of App. at 24. 
However, the trial court correctly rejected Appellants' permissive use arguments, R.l 150 
at 366, which are repeated here. 
First, Appellants argue that commercial employees and business invitees, along 
with the BLM and county employees, were permissive users of the West Stansbury Road, 
not members of the public. Br. of App. at 26-28. Appellees do not necessarily disagree, 
but believe it is immaterial since most of the use of the West Stansbury Road was by 
members of the public that do not fall into the category of permissive users. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the effect of some permissive use on public 
dedication of a road in Heber City, 942 P.2d at 309. There, the Court held that the 
Airport Road had been dedicated and abandoned to the public due to the wide variety of 
public use. Id. at 311. The court noted that, while some who used the Airport Road to 
access the airport were permissive users as business invitees, the majority of use had been 
public use. The Court cited numerous witnesses who testified to using the road for such 
purposes as shooting events at the gun club, a lovers' lane, horseback riding, picnicking, 
viewing airplanes, and hauling hay. Id. at 310. There was also testimony from several 
witnesses that no one ever stopped them from using the Airport Road. Id. at 310-11. 
Kohler further demonstrates that some permissive use of a road does not defeat its 
public dedication. At issue in Kohler was the right of access to a road crossing the Martin 
property. The road had historically been used for many purposes, including access to the 
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Buehler Hot Pots, a business adjoining the road. The court held that, although use of the 
road to access the Buehler Hot Pots was a permissive use, the road was still a public road. 
Abundant unrebutted evidence had been presented at trial to support the conclusion that 
the general public used the road for purposes other than to access the Buehler Hot Pots, 
including for recreational and agricultural purposes. Kohler, 916 P.2d at 913. Owners 
along the road testified they considered the road public, did not fence or post signs, and 
did not stop the public from using the road. Other individuals also testified of the general 
public opinion that the road was public. Id. 
Similarly, in the present case, Appellee presented overwhelming, unrebutted 
evidence11 that the West Stansbury Road had been used for a variety of purposes, and not 
just for access to the businesses along the road. Sixty-six witnesses, through live 
testimony or affidavit, testified to their varied uses of the road: hiking, picnicking, 
horseback riding, bicycling, motor biking, hunting and bird watching. R.l 138, Findings 
22-23. Many testified to seeing members of the public use the West Stansbury Road. 
Affidavits of Hullinger, R.1366; Lemmon, R.1397; Murray, R.1401; Wingfield, R.1520; 
Barrus, R.l 184. Additionally, many of the commercial employees testified to using the 
West Stansbury Road outside their employment capacities, i.e, for personal recreational 
purposes. Finding 20, R.l 138. Other landowners along the road testified that they 
considered the road public. Neither they nor Appellants fenced the West Stansbury Road 
11
 R.l 138, Finding 22; R.l 136, Finding 33; R.l 136, Finding 26; R.l 134, Finding 
43; R.l 133, Finding 44. 
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before 1993, nor did they post "No Trespassing" signs referring to the road. Finding 25, 
R.l 137. Even Appellants did not stop the public from using the Road until they put a 
locked gate across it in 1993, though they sporadically told people using off-road property 
or shooting from the road onto off-road property to leave. Findings 30-32, R. 1136. 
Second, Appellants contend that "the overwhelming evidence of record compels 
the conclusion that members of the public who used the West Stansbury Road for 
recreational purposes were permissive users." Br. of App. at 30. Appellants reason that, 
because they did not actively prevent members of the general public from using the road 
for recreational purposes, these recreational users were permissively using the road and, 
thus, their usage should not qualify as "public" use. The trial court correctly rejected this 
argument, stating: 
One cannot rationally, or successfully argue that permitting anyone and 
everyone to use the West Stansbury Road "as long as they behaved 
themselves," made the public permissive users. Rather, such usage is the 
grist upon which public dedication is ground. . . . An overt act is required by 
the owner to distinguish the general public from a permissive user. An 
overt act may be to unlock a gate for a limited time period, or give a pass to 
certain individuals, or to openly declare that a particular person, or class of 
persons, are permitted to use the property, while others are not. No such 
distinctions were made here, as the public was able to use the West 
Stansbury Road as it found it necessary and convenient. 
R. 1030-31 (emphasis added). 
Appellants ignore the trial court's findings concerning the public's use of the road. 
Numerous members of the public testified to their many and varied recreational uses of 
the West Stansbury Road. Finding of Fact 22, R.l 138. They never asked permission to 
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use the road, were not asked to leave the road, and observed other members of the public 
using the road. Finding 23, R.l 138. 
Appellants also argue that recreational use of remote, unenclosed lands should be 
presumed permissive, and urge this court to adopt such a presumption. Br. of App. at 29. 
In support, Appellants cite several out-of-state cases, all of which can be easily 
distinguished as they deal with either adverse possession12 or are decided under state laws 
that require proof of the owner's intent to dedicate a road to public use.13 Adverse 
possession involves a test completely irrelevant to this public road dedication matter, and 
Utah courts no longer require the plaintiff to prove the owner's intent to dedicate the road 
to the public. See, e.g., Heber City, 942 P.2d at 3\\; Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099; 
Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449. Appellants offer no further argument on this point and fail to 
suggest any method to distinguish public users from permissive users. Therefore, this 
court should reject their arguments for the reason so ably articulated by the trial court. 
Appellants next assert that "[u]nder Utah law, it is well established that the grading 
of a road by a public entity with the permission of the landowner does not evidence public 
use." Br. of App. at 28 (citing Peterson v. Combe, 438 P.2d 545 (Utah 1968). This is an 
incorrect statement of both Utah law and the holding in Peterson. The county graded the 
road in Peterson as part of an in-kind trade arrangement with the landowners, not because 
12
 Kessinger v. Matulevich, 925 P.2d 864, 869 (Mont. 1996); Barker v. Board of 
County Com 'rs, 49 F. Supp.2d 1203, 1216 (D.Colo. 1999). 
]3Clelandv. Westvaco Corp., 431 S.E.2d 264, 266-67 (S.C. App. 1993); Primark, 
Inc. v. Burien Gardens Assoc., 823 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Wa. App. 1992); County of 
Langlade v. Raster, 440 N.W.2d 772 (Wis. App. 1996). 
29 
the road had been designated a county road. Id. at 548. Here, Appellants have never paid 
Tooele County, in kind or otherwise, for grading the West Stansbury Road for nearly 
forty years. The Road was designated a Class B county road and Tooele County received 
state funding to use for grading such roads, public money that could not properly be used 
to grade private roads.14 
Finally, Appellants argue that allowing evidence of public recreational use to 
establish that the West Stansbury Road was used as a public thoroughfare is inconsistent 
with the 197915 Recreational Users Act. Br. of App. at 35-37. Appellants failed to 
preserve this issue for appeal because they never obtained a ruling from the trial court on 
it. Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(5)(A); MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 948-49 (Utah 1998). 
For these reasons, the trial court correctly concluded that the West Stansbury Road 
was continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years, satisfying section 72-5-
104(1). 
"See R.l 130-40, Findings 7-19; R.1149 at 106-08, 114, 185, 188; R.l 150 at 244, 
263; R.l 151 at 432. 
I5The Recreational Users Act became effective in 1979; thus, it cannot apply to 
evidence of public recreational use prior to 1979. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1 et seq. 
(West 2004). 
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II. ORDINANCE 93-9 IS INVALID BECAUSE THE COUNTY FAILED TO 
MAIL NOTICE TO THE STATE, AN ABUTTING LANDOWNER TO THE 
WEST STANSBURY ROAD AS DESCRIBED IN THE NOTICE, AS REQUIRED 
BY FORMER SECTION 27-12-102.4 
Appellants argue that the district court erred in declaring Ordinance 93-9 null and void 
because (A) the "State was not an abutting landowner to the County road being vacated 
and, therefore, was not entitled to written notice," and (B) even if the State was entitled to 
notice, it received actual notice, which should be sufficient under the statute. Br. of App. 
at44-47.16 
A. Tooele County Required the District Court to Invalidate Ordinance 93-9 Upon 
Finding the "State's Land Abuts the West Stansbury Road" as Described in 
the Statutory Notice. 
In arguing that the State was not an abutting landowner, Appellants first challenge 
the district court's legal interpretation of State v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680 
Br. of App. at 43-44. Although it is not clear, Appellants appear to argue that Tooele 
County required the trial court to invalidate Ordinance 93-9 only if the publically 
dedicated portion of the West Stansbury Road abuts the meander line. Br. of App. at 43-
44. Appellants misread Tooele County. 
The trial court held Ordinance 93-9 invalid (R.582-84) when all parties conceded 
that the West Stansbury Road physically abuts the meander line (R.620 at 1, 15) and upon 
16Appellants apparently believe that, if Ordinance 93-9 is valid, the road would 
have been properly vacated and such vacation would trump a public dedication under 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-105 (West 2004). 
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determining that the proposed vacation notice "described . . . the entire length and breadth 
of[theroad]."(R.620at38). 
In Tooele County, the Utah Supreme Court held that "[i]f the district court 
determines that the State's land abuts West Stansbury Road as it is described in the 
County's proposed vacation notice, then the court mus t . . . overturn[] Tooele County 
Ordinance 93-9 as null and void." 2002 UT 8, U 25, 44 P.3d at 690 (emphasis added). At 
the time of the decision, two disputed issues of fact existed: first, whether the West 
Stansbury Road abuts the meander line, id. ^ 7, 44 P.3d at 684; and second, whether the 
West Stansbury Road was dedicated to the public. Id. ^ 20 n.7, 44 P.3d at 689. While the 
Court was aware of both issues of fact, it remanded the case for the sole determination of 
whether the road, as "described in the County's proposed vacation notice," abuts the 
meander line. Id. *[{ 25, 44 P.3d at 690. The Court implicitly rejected the notion that the 
public nature of the road the county proposed to vacate was material in determining 
whether the State was entitled to statutory notice of the county's proposal and the 
upcoming public hearing about it. Instead, the Court was concerned only with whether 
abutting landowners to the road as described in the proposed vacation notice had been 
given adequate statutory notice of the proposed vacation and the public hearing at which 
the county would decide if the statutory criteria for vacating its interest in the road were 
met. As the Utah Supreme Court recognized, the statutory notice requirement is not 
contingent on abutting landowners first litigating in the courts whether the road, as 
described by the county in the notice, is, in fact, public. 
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Public policy supports this interpretation. The notice sent out by the county in 
1993 announced its intention to vacate whatever interest it had in the West Stansbury 
Road all the way to its end at the dike. Prior to taking such an action, the county was 
required to provide all abutting landowners mailed written notice of the proposed action, 
as well as the time, date and place of the mandatory public hearing to determine if there 
was good cause for vacating the road and whether that action would be detrimental to the 
general interest. Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-102.1, -102.4 (Supp. 1993); Tooele County, 
2002 UT 8, H 15, 44 P.3d at 686. 
It would unduly burden owners of property abutting the road described in the 
notice to have to run to the courts for an adjudication of whether the road was, in fact, 
dedicated to public use before the county held a public hearing and acted on its proposal 
to vacate its interest in an entire road. Stated another way, whether or not the county 
(and, through it, the public) was ultimately found to have an interest in the road all the 
way to the dike, owners of lands abutting the roadway that the county proposed to vacate 
were entitled to notice under the statute so they could participate in the vacation 
proceeding held by the county. 
Because the vacation notice proposed to vacate "the entire length and breadth of 
[the road]" (R.620 at 38) and because the road abuts the meander line (R.584), the State 
was statutorily entitled to mailed, written notice. See Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ^ 25, 44 
P.3d at 690. Therefore, the trial court correctly held Ordinance 93-9 invalid. 
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B. Appellants have Failed to Marshal the Evidence Supporting The Trial 
Court's Finding that the Road was, in fact. Used by the Public Northward All 
the Way to the USMag Gate at the Dike. 
In any case, even if Tooele County did require the trial court to find that the West 
Stansbury Road was public all the way northward to the dike at the meander line, the trial 
court did so. "Until 1993 when the Bleazards installed a locked gate, the public's use of 
the West Stansbury Road was physically unfettered and included the entire stretch of the 
road to the gate at the entrance of the [USMag] dike . . . ." Finding 42, R.l 134. In 
addition, the trial court found that the public had access to and used the road to the gate at 
the dike and that the county graded the road to the gate "at the very north end of the 
Island." Findings 43-44, R.l 133-34. 
Appellants purport to challenge these findings as clearly erroneous, Br. of App. at 
37-38,n arguing that if "a portion of the West Stansbury Road became a public road by 
dedication, the trial court erred in ruling that the public's interest in the road extended all 
the way to the meander line." Id. at 37. 
This Court should decline to address Appellants' attack on the trial court's 
findings because-as is obvious from the evidence cited above in this brief-they have 
17Appellants argue for the first time on appeal that the state owned the USMag 
parcel from 1968 to 1988, the period during which USMag was paying the State on an 
installment contract. Therefore, Appellants contend, a dedication could not have occurred 
over USMag's property because a road on state-owned lands cannot be dedicated to the 
public. Br. of App. at 43. The court should not address this issue because it was not 
raised below. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). In any event, if the State 
did own the USMag parcel, as Appellants contend, the State would still be an abutting 
landowner to the road proposed to be vacated and, thus, still entitled to mailed, written 
notice under the statute. 
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failed to marshal the supporting evidence and demonstrate how, the findings under attack 
are not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Young v. Young, 1999 UT 3, ^  15, 
979 P.2d 338; A W1NC Corp., 2005 UT App 168, Tj 10, P.3d at 1230. Appellants have not 
set forth "in comprehensive and fastidious order . . . every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Id. at j^ 9 
(emphasis in original). In such a circumstance, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the challenged findings. Id. at j^ 10 (citing Heber City Corp., 942 P.2d at 
312). 
Even had Appellants marshaled the evidence, they cannot demonstrate that the trial 
court's findings were clearly erroneous. Appellants concede that three members of the 
public used the road up to the USMag gate and that Tony Perry saw people using the road 
beyond the USMag gate. Br. of App. at 39-40. This evidence alone would be sufficient 
to support the trial court's findings. See A WINC Corp., 2005 UT App 168, ^|5, 112 P.3d 
at 1230 (holding dedication supported by four witnesses testifying to use of road and 
seeing others use road). 
In addition, however, Appellees presented a large number of uncontradicted 
witnesses who used the entire road recreationally, and also witnesses who saw other 
members of the public using the entire road recreationally. For example. William H. 
Henwood testified that he used the road "all the way to the northern tip" for picnicking, 
camping, and hunting and saw others using the road for hiking, biking, picnicking, and 
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hunting. (R. 1347-52); see also Affidavits of Larry Hammond (R. 1329-34); Michael R. 
Anderson (R.l 189-94); Edward C. Barrus (R.l 198-1203). 
Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the road was segmented short of 
the USMag gate. There are no signs indicating that the nature of the road changes; there 
is no gate; there is no evidence that anyone was asked to leave any portion of the road. 
The mere fact that some users turned around at the Cable Gate Road at the USMag gate 
does not negate the public nature of the road up to that gate. "Public" need not be a great 
many persons and use need not be constant or continuous. Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809. 
So long as members of the public were free to use that portion of the road whenever 
"convenient or necessary," and such users did so for a period often years, the road was 
dedicated to the public. Id. 
C. Because the Statute Unambiguously Requires Written Notice to be 
Mailed to Abutting Landowners, Actual Notice is Legally Insufficient 
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in holding that "actual notice" would not 
be sufficient to meet the mailed, written notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-
102.4 (Supp.1993). Br. of App. at 44-47.18 The trial court refused, "in the absence of 
ambiguity[, to] disturb 'explicit legislative requirements' and read into this statute an 
18Appellants cite several non-binding cases holding that, in certain circumstances, a 
party can waive a written notice requirement. See Estate of Konigunda v. Town of 
Coventry, 605 A.2d 834, 835-36 (R.l. 1992); Ryan v. Zoning Bd. of Review of Town of 
New Shoreham, 656 A.2d 612, 616 (R.l. 1995). However, Appellants have not argued 
waiver, which requires a showing of (i) an existing right, (ii) a benefit or advantage, (iii) 
knowledge of its existence, and (iv) intent to relinquish such right. U.S. Realty 86 Assocs. 
v. Sec. lnv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, % 16, 40 P.3d 586, 589. These cases do not support 
Appellants' argument that actual notice is sufficient under the statute. 
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actual notice exception." (R.606-607) (quoting Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 
109,H15,37P.3d H569 1159). 
Former section 21-\2-\§2A unambiguously provided that, when a county decides 
to vacate its interest in a county road, it must mail "notice to landowners directly affected 
by the proposal." Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, \ 12, 44 P.3d at 686. Utah courts have 
consistently held that the notice provisions of section 27-12-102.4 must be strictly 
complied with for a vacation to be valid. "[N]o vacation occurs unless the specific 
statutory requirements of [section] 27-12-102.1 to -102.4 are met." Henderson v. 
Osguthorpe, 657 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 1982); accord Ercanbrack v. Judd, 524 P.2d 595, 
597 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, Utah courts interpreting other notice statutes have held 
that "actual notice" is insufficient where a statute clearly requires that written notice be 
given. See Greene, 2001 UT 109, \ 15, 37 P.3d at 1159; Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 
2003 UT 25, U5, 69 P.3d 1287, 1289 ("This court has long required strict compliance with 
[the notice of claim provision of the Governmental Immunity Act]. Indeed, even actual 
notice of the claim, received by the appropriate governmental officials, has long been 
deemed insufficient to give the courts jurisdiction when a claimant fails to strictly comply 
with the statute."). The trial court correctly held that actual notice is insufficient to meet 
the notice requirements of former section 27-12-102.4. 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that Ordinance 93-9 is invalid. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DENIED PUBLIC DEDICATION OF THE PASS 
CANYON AND CABLE GATE SIDE ROADS BY ERRONEOUSLY 
ADDING DISPOSITIVE ELEMENTS TO SECTION 72-5-104(1) 
The State cross-appeals the trial court's conclusion that the Pass Canyon Road and 
the Cable Gate Road were not dedicated to public use under section 72-5-104. 
As the trial court found, Pass Canyon Road is an unimproved dirt road built by Ed 
Cassity when he owned property on Stansbury Island to access his private lands on the 
east side of the Island. It crosses private property from the West Stansbury Road and 
provides access to the Appellants' private lands and to BLM land on the eastern side of 
the Island. Members of the public and governmental employees have used the Pass 
Canyon Road since its construction in the early 1950s and continuing until 1993, when 
the Appellants blocked the main road with a locked gate. There is no evidence of any 
"No Trespassing" signs on the Pass Canyon Road. (Findings 54-57, R.l 132). 
Similarly, there is overwhelming, uncontroverted evidence that the ungated and 
unsigned Cable Gate Road was used continuously by the public since the 1950s for 
recreational purposes, including access to the public BLM lands in the eastern and 
northern parts of the Island. (Finding 62, R. 1131; R. 1971, P-9; R. 1977, P-17; R. 1984, 
1978 aerial photo, P-24, P-26, Addenda 4-5; R.l 149 at 55, 120-24,119, 167, 176, 210; R. 
1150 at 223, 251, 302). Individuals and families used the road for decades when they 
wished, without asking permission and without being asked to leave, until the West 
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Stansbury Road was blocked by the Appellants in 1993.19 There were no gates or other 
obstacles to access the Cable Gate Road until Appellant John Bleazard placed a cable 
across the road in the early 1990s on land owned by USMag, which the latter removed. 
(R.l 149 at 139, 206; R.1976-77, P-16, P-17). There were no "No Trespassing" signs on 
the road or at the beginning of the road. (See Finding 25, R.l 137; R.l 149 at 152, 179, 
193,206). 
Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that the State had not shown that these two 
side roads were continuously used as a public thoroughfare for ten years. (Conclusion 18, 
R.l 127). The court based its ultimate conclusion concerning the side roads on two 
perceived differences between them and the West Stansbury Road, which it concluded 
had been dedicated to public use: (1) the owners of land adjacent to the roads-namely, 
Appellants-differentiated between the West Stansbury Road and the side roads, regarding 
the latter as private and asking members of the public to leave them (Findings 59, 64, R. 
1130-31); and (2) the roads were not designated as Class B county roads and were not 
maintained by the County (Findings 58, 63, R. 1131). 
The trial court committed reversible error insofar as it treated either or both of 
these factors as determinative elements in its section 72-5-104 inquiry. 
As noted above, Utah's statute requires proof of only three elements to show that a 
road has been dedicated to public use: "there must be (i) continuous use, (ii) as a public 
19For the cites to these forty-six supporting affidavits, with maps, see footnote 6, 
supra. 
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thoroughfare, (iii) for a period often years." Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310. Once these 
elements are shown, the road is public, and the trial court may not add additional elements 
not found in the plain language of the dedication statute. See id. at 313. 
In Heber City, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court for adding to the 
road dedication statute an exception from its requirements "in the interests of fairness and 
justice." Id. Similarly, the trial court in this case erroneously added the adjacent 
landowners' treatment of the side roads as private and the County's failure to treat the 
side roads as public as determinative elements under section 72-5-104. 
While early Utah cases required proof of an adjacent landowner's intent to 
dedicate a private road to public use, in addition to the above three statutory elements, this 
position was explicitly rejected nearly a quarter of a century ago: "The determination that 
a roadway has been continuously used by members of the public for at least 10 years is 
the sole requirement for it to become a public road. It is not necessary to prove the 
owner's intent to offer the road to the public as contended by defendants." Thurman v. 
Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 449 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added); accord Heber City, 942 P.2d at 
311; Draper City, 888 P.2d at 1099. Although the adjacent landowners' views about the 
road's status are relevant to the court's determination of whether the road has been 
dedicated to public use, but see note 7, supra, the trial court erred in treating the 
landowners' views as determinative of the outcome here under section 72-5-104. 
Likewise, whether the County maintained the side roads as public roads is relevant 
to the inquiry under section 72-5-104. E.g., Heber City, 942 P.2d at 309 (discussing 
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disputed road's Class B maintenance by county as one of many factors supporting its 
dedication to public use as a matter of law). But a party seeking to establish that a road is 
public under section 72-5-104 need not prove that a governmental entity designated or 
maintained the disputed road as a public road. See, e.g., Leo M. Bertagnole, Inc. v. Pine 
Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981) (affirming conclusion that disputed road 
was dedicated to public use, with no mention of county maintenance or classification of 
road as public); Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449 (same); Lindsay Land & Livestock, 285 P. at 
646-47 (same); AW1NC Corp., 2005 UT App 168 (same). 
Because the trial court erroneously used these factors-i.e., that neither the 
Appellants nor the county treated the side roads as public roads-as dispositive, additional 
elements to the statute that trumped all other facts about continuous public use of the side 
roads as thoroughfares, its conclusion about the side roads should be reversed. See 
Heber City, 942 P.2d at 313. 
IV. THE FINDINGS AND UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE DEMONSTRATE 
THAT THE SIDE ROADS WERE DEDICATED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, TO 
PUBLIC USE BEFORE APPELLANTS TREATED THE ROADS AS PRIVATE 
The trial court's erroneous conclusion that the Pass Canyon Road and the Cable 
Gate Road were not dedicated to public use is premised on its finding that adjacent 
landowners treated these side roads as private. The evidence that supports this finding 
came only from Appellants and concerned their own views and actions after 1977, not 
those of other owners of land adjacent to the side roads before then. 
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Appellant John Bleazard and employees of Six Mile Ranch testified that, from 
1977 until 1993, they asked people to leave the Six Mile Ranch portion of the Pass 
Canyon Road (R.l 150 at 325, 371, 380; R.l 151 at 429) and also the Cable Gate Road (R. 
1150 at 325, 371; R.l 151 at 429), although Appellants had no ownership interest in land 
crossed by the Cable Gate Road until 1987. In 1977, Appellant John Bleazard became 
manager of the Six Mile Ranch and oversaw ranch operations adjacent to the Pass 
Canyon Road. (R.l 150 at 305, 325, 371, 387). Bleazard testified that after 1977 he had 
law enforcement deal with trespassers (R.l 150 at 312-14) and sometimes asked people to 
leave the road area if they were harassing the cattle or creating other difficulties (R.l 150 
at 338, 339, 358-59, 385; R.1976, P-16). Otherwise, he allowed people to use the road 
(R.l 150 at 338, 339, 358-59, 385; R.1976, P-16). 
Even if true, these facts have no bearing on the discrete question of whether the 
side roads were already dedicated to public use between the early 1950s and 1977, when 
Appellants acquired any interest in lands adjacent to the Pass Canyon Road or the Cable 
Gate Road and began treating the side roads as private. The overwhelming record 
evidence establishes that both of these side roads had, by 1977, been freely used for 
decades by the general public as a passageway to access public lands in the northern and 
eastern parts of Stansbury Island. See Heber City, 942 P.2d at 311. 
In Heber City, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's conclusion that a 
disputed road was not dedicated to public use, based on its detailed review of the trial 
court's findings and uncontradicted record evidence about the road's uninterrupted public 
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use for various purposes since 1947-such as shooting, riding, hauling hay, and 
necking-until the city closed the road in 1989. 942 P.2d at 310-11. The Court affirmed a 
road dedication in Thurman after reviewing evidence that: the road was used by the 
public for more than twenty years before one adjacent landowner blocked it; witnesses 
had observed other members of the public using the road; users of the road had not been 
asked to leave the road; the road was the only access to Forest Service land; law 
enforcement was not called to cite users of the road for trespass; the road was not 
obstructed to prevent access; and the posted "No Trespassing" signs related to the 
property adjacent to the road, not to the road itself. 626 P.2d at 448-49. 
Here, the record shows that the two side roads were, as a matter of law, dedicated 
to public use by 1977: 
Pass Canyon Road 
The trial court specifically found ten years of continuous public use of this side 
road: "Public members and governmental employees have used the Pass Canyon Road 
since its construction continuing to 1993 when Appellants installed the gate prohibiting 
access to the West Stansbury Road." (R.l 132, Finding 56). The road, constructed in the 
early 1950s, was freely used by the public for nearly forty years (R.l 183-1537, Sixty 
Affidavits; R.1984, P-24, P-26, Addenda 4-5; R.1977, P-17; R.l 149 at 45, 49, 55, 77, 
120, 123, 124, 165, 168, 177, 184, 188, 192, 210, 214; R.l 150 at 221, 223, 227, 230, 
262,267). 
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Before 1977, Ed Cassity and the Cooks were owners of the property adjacent to the 
Pass Canyon Road. There is no evidence they either asked anyone to leave that road just 
for using the road. Richard Castagno, the only one at trial to address the issue, testified 
that Cassity believed the road public and "never threw anybody off anyplace out there" 
(R.l 150 at 251). Castagno continued by saying that Cassity believed the public had a 
right to be on the roads and, while he would have liked to kick people off, he couldn't 
because they had a right to be there (R.l 150 at 250). When people were hunting, Cassity 
did ask them to go to public lands to the south of the Island if cattle were present (R.l 150 
at 256, 266). If the cows were not present, Cassity didn't object to people being there 
(R.l 150 at 266), regardless of where they were (R.l 150 at 266-267). 
The Cooks, owners of the western eighth of a mile of the road, considered the road 
public and allowed the public unfettered use (R.l 149 at 188, 189, 196). See Illustration 
One, supra, at 8. The Cooks had no restrictions on their property and allowed anyone to 
use it (R.l 149 at 196). The BLM, which manages public lands adjacent to the eastern 
two miles of the road, considered the road public (R.l 149 at 118, 131; R.l 976, P-16). 
Until 1993, neither Appellants nor any other adjacent landowner placed any restriction on 
the Pass Canyon Road to cut it off from the Cook's or the BLM*s portions of the road (R. 
1149 at 179, 193). People were free to pass through the short segment of Six Mile 
Ranch's portion of the road to enter BLM land. Even John Bleazard didn't recall ever 
asking anyone to leave the portions of the road owned by the Cooks and the BLM (R. 
1150 at 381). For at least twenty-five years (1952 to 1977), all adjacent landowners 
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considered the road public and allowed unrestricted public use. Every witness or affiant 
who had used the Pass Canyon Road declared that permission was never sought or given 
to use either of the side roads (R.l 149 at 123; R.l 183-1537, thirty-seven affidavits). 
Cable Gate Road 
Appellants had no legal interest in property adjacent to the Cable Gate Road from 
1952 until 1987 (R.l 149 at 151, 208; R.l 150 at 287, 290-91; R.l992-93, 1995-99, 2002-
03, 2006-07, P-32, -33, -36 to -40, -43, -44, -46, -47). Thus, they had no authority to 
grant or deny permission to use the Cable Gate Road. 
The Castagnos and USMag, who were owners of lands adjacent to the road, 
considered the road public and allowed the public use of the road at will and as often as it 
wanted (R.l 149 at 139, 196, 209, 214). The only adjacent landowner who testified about 
the Cable Gate Road status prior to 1987 (when Appellants began purchasing parcels 
adjacent to the road), Dave Castagno, stated that he never asked anyone to leave (R.l 149 
at 206, 211), and never stopped anyone from using the road (R.l 149 at 211). Rhea 
Castagno never told anyone they could not use the road (R.l 149 at 196). Ed Clyde, 
trustee of the trust that owned land adjacent to the road, and Irene Price, a trust 
beneficiary, never testified. But there is no evidence or testimony that they considered the 
road private or ever asked anyone to leave the road. 
The owners of land adjacent to the Cable Gate Road not only considered the road 
public until 1987, they also allowed the public free and unfettered access to the road and 
lands (R.l 149 at 139, 196, 209, 214). Moreover, there is no evidence that any law 
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enforcement official was ever asked by any adjacent property owner to remove anyone 
from the road. All testimony regarding "trespassers" dealt with land owned by Appellants 
after 1977, not the road (R. 1150 at 310-315). 
The only owners who are known to have ever taken any action or express an 
opinion as to the private nature of the Cable Gate Road are the Appellants. In the early 
1990s John Bleazard placed a cable across the road on USMag's land (R.l 149 at 139; 
R. 1976-7, P-16, P-17). This was well after Appellants purchased the property on the road 
and over thirty-five years after the public began using the road at will and as often as it 
liked for recreation and access to BLM land. 
The evidence is overwhelming that people used the Cable Gate Road from its 
construction in the 1950s until the road was closed by Appellants beginning in 1987. 
Dozens of witnesses and affiants declared that they never asked permission to use the 
road (see Affidavits at R.l 183-1537). Other witnesses testified to such use (R.l 149 at 
167, 176; R.l 150 at 230). Additional members of the public were also seen using the 
road(R. 1149 at 55, 120, 121, 122, 124, 210; R.l 150 at 223, 251; R.l 183-1537, 
Affidavits of Gwynn, Rale, Hullinger, Lemmon, Miles, Murray, W. Perry, T. Perry, 
Sullivan, Tripp, Watson, and White). Gary Kidd testified that 50% of the time he was on 
the Island performing his governmental duties, he saw members of the public recreating 
on the road and the northern part of the Island by the Cable Gate Road (R.l 149 at 121-
22). 
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Finally, as in Thurman, 626 P.2d at 449, both roads provide the only public road 
access to federally managed public lands. (R.l 149 at 124-25; R.l 132, 1131, Findings 55, 
62; R.l 149 at 54-55, 115-16, 119, 187; R.l 150 at 302, 380; R.1964, P-l; R.1984, P-24; 
R.l977, P-l7; 1978 Aerial Map, P-26; R.2007, P-48; Addenda 3-5). Terryl Hunsaker, 
former Tooele County Commissioner, confirmed the purpose of the side roads was to 
access the public lands (R.l 149 at 55). 
The numerous individuals who testified in person and by affidavit: used both the 
Pass Canyon and Cable Gate Roads for more than a ten-year period before 1977 (R.l 183-
1537, Sixty affidavits noted above in footnotes 5-6); saw evidence of others using the 
roads (R.l 149 at 55, 120, 168, 210; R.l 151 at 430); were not prohibited from accessing 
or using the roads prior to 1977 and 1987, respectively (R.l 149 at 193, 206, 210; R.l 150 
at 223, 251); and were not asked to leave the roads (R.l 183-1537, Sixty affidavits). 
In sum. the uncontradicted record evidence and the trial court's express findings 
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the side roads were dedicated to public use by 1977 
because they were continuously used as public thoroughfares for at least ten years. See 
Heber City, 942 P.2d at 310. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State asks the Court to affirm the trial court's 
judgment as to the public status of the West Stansbury Road and to reverse the trial 
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court's judgment concerning the Pass Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road, declaring 
that these two side roads have, as a matter of law, been dedicated to public use. 
Respectfully submitted th i sc" day of July, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
fephen G. Schwendiman 
Alison D. Garner 
Jonathan G. Jemming 
Assistant Attorneys General 
160E. 300 South, 5th Floor 
PO BOX 140815 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0815 
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State of Utah 
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ADDENDUM 1 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^pJJfycferiT 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH, SIX MILE 
RANCH COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, CRAIG S. BLEAZARD, 
an individual, JOHN D. BLEAZARD, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 990300437 
The above-captioned matter, was tried to the Court on March 2, 3, and 4, 2004. Plaintiff 
State of Utah ("State"), was represented by Kurt E. Seel and Stephen G. Schwendiman, Assistant 
Attorneys General; defendant Tooele County ("County") was represented by Douglas J. Ahlstrom, 
Tooele County Attorney; and defendants Six Mile Ranch Company, Craig S. Bleazard, Mark C. 
Bleazard and John D. Bleazard ("Bleazards") were represented by Brent A. Bohman. The Court, 
having heard oral arguments of counsel, received the testimony of numerous witnesses, both live and 
by Affidavit, and received and reviewed evidence and exhibits, hereby makes the following Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The West Stansbury Road is a highway that existed prior to January 1,1992, and for 
purpose of this litigation is defined as the graded, gravel roadway, beginning from the south line of 
Section 16 of Township 1 North, Range 6 West and terminating at the MagCorp gate on the 
MagCorp dike on the north end of the Island. 
2. The West Stansbury Road traverses State lands at or about the meander line in 
Section 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Meridian, at the Magnesium Corporation 
of America ("MagCorp") gate immediately prior to the dike. The West Stansbury Road is located 
exclusively on private lands until it reaches the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. 
3. The West Stansbury Road was maintained or used by a responsible authority, 
including Tooele County and MagCorp. 
4. From 1949 through 1992 the West Stansbury Road was used by the public as a 
thoroughfare for more than ten years. 
5. Stansbury Island is owned in part by private owners, including the Bleazards, who 
own a substantial portion of the private property on the Island, the Cooks, the Castagnos, Amoco Oil 
Company, MagCorp, through which the West Stansbury Road traverses, and state and federal lands. 
The federal lands are located adjacent to the side roads on the elevated portions of the Island to the 
east of the West Stansbury Road and are overseen by the Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"). 
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6. Ownership of the Island has changed over the forty years covered by this action. 
Stansbury Island consists of approximately 18,000 acres of land on a peninsula located in Tooele 
County on the south end of the Great Salt Lake. About one-third of the acreage has been patented 
into private ownership. Prior to 1992, most of the lands presently owned by the defendants were 
jointly acquired and owned by J.J. Castagno and Ed Cassity. In approximately 1952, those lands 
were partitioned into separate ownership. Ed Cassity received the majority of the remaining lands 
on which the West Stansbury Road is located including all of Section 16, and the balance of Section 
9 of Township 1 North, Range 6 West. 
Upon the death of J.J. Castagno in 1960, title to these lands was held by his wife, Edith 
Castagno. Upon her death in 1973, Glen and Rhea Castagno received title to said lands. Thereafter, 
Glen and Rhea Castagno divorced. In connection therewith, Rhea Castagno received a one-half (Vi) 
interest in the property. Following the death of Glen Castagno, his son David Castagno received, 
in 1983, Glen's one-half (!/2) interest therein. Beginning in the late 1980fs, defendants began 
purchasing various parcels of the lands owned by David and Rhea Castagno and currently own all 
of said lands with the exception of one 40 acre parcel that is owned by Rhea Castagno but which is 
not pertinent to this action. 
In approximately 1962, Ed Cassity transferred his lands into Six Mile Ranch Company, of 
which except for a few shares given to family, he owned all of the stock. Upon his death in 1977, 
Bonnie and Max Bleazard received fifty-three percent (53%) of the stock in Six Mile Ranch 
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Company and his other daughter, Kate, received the other forty-seven percent (47%). Defendants 
subsequently acquired all of that stock and currently own one hundred percent (100%) of Six Mile 
Ranch Company. 
7. From 1954 to 1993, the West Stansbury Road was designated a Class "B" county 
road by Tooele County and approved by the State of Utah. 
8. Tooele County received State funding for the maintenance of Class "B" county roads, 
which included the West Stansbury Road. 
9. In order to be classified a Class "B" road, the Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") regulations provide that Class "B" designations apply to "public roads under the 
jurisdiction of, and maintained by, a county, over which four wheeled vehicles, people and animals 
are free to travel. Private ways, fenced or unfenced, are excluded." 
10. Prior to 1997, UDOT conducted physical inspections of each designated Class "B" 
road, including the West Stansbury Road, looking for evidence to support the Class "B" designation, 
i.e., that the road was being maintained by the County, and that it was open to public travel, and not 
being held out as private property. 
11. Inspections of Class "B" roads were conducted at approximately five year intervals, 
either from physical travel on the subject roadway or by air. 
12. Gates or signage limiting public access would also be noted as part of the surveys and 
recorded on maps prepared by UDOT on each such Class "B" designated road. 
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13. On nine separate occasions, spanning 45 years from 1954 through 1997, this physical 
inspection was conducted on the West Stansbury Road, either by air or physical travel upon the road 
itself, and approval was given for its Class "B" designation as a county road by UDOT. 
14. On each occasion when UDOT approved the West Stansbury Road designation, the 
Tooele County Commission approved the designation of the West Stansbury Road as a Class "B" 
dedicated public road eligible for State funds, and Tooele County did receive funding for the West 
Stansbury Road. 
15. No map prepared by UDOT as part of the Class "B" road designation of the West 
Stansbury Road noted any restriction to public use on the West Stansbury Road, such as fencing or 
signage restrictions. 
16. Designation of the West Stansbury Road as a Class "B" road certified that the road 
was open to public travel and was maintained by Tooele County. 
17 Tooele County Roads Department employees on behalf of the County, graded the 
West Stansbury Road two to three times every year from 1954 to 1993 as part of their official county 
responsibilities 
18. During the many years the county maintained the road there were no physical 
restrictions or barriers on road usage anywhere along the West Stansbury Road, including the 
absence of any signs designating the road as private property or otherwise prohibiting the open 
access of the West Stansbury Road. 
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19. It was contrary to state highway regulations for state funds provided to the County 
to be used for maintaining a private road on private property where the general public was not 
allowed to go. 
20. Numerous county, state, and federal employees used the West Stansbury Road for 
both official and private purposes without restriction or requiring permission over a thirty-year 
period. 
21. From 1949 until 1993, the general public used the West Stansbury Road and could 
"come and go" on the road at will and at times as they chose at their convenience. 
22. From 1949 until 1993, the general public used the West Stansbury Road for numerous 
recreational activities including picnicking, rock hunting, hiking, camping, horseback riding, 
mountain biking, sightseeing, cookouts, hunting, motorcycle riding, organized activities such as 
"Senior Sneak Week," Easter weekend "egg hunts," athletic events and sunbathing. This usage of 
the West Stansbury Road included the use of automobiles, campers, trailers, motorcycles, all-terrain 
vehicles, bicycles, horses and other similar items. 
23. The vast majority of the general public, who participated in the many recreational 
activities from use of the West Stansbury Road, did not seek permission from anyone to use the West 
Stansbury Road, nor were they asked to leave the West Stansbury Road. 
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24. The general public who participated in the many recreational activities used not only 
the West Stansbury Road, but used surrounding areas off of the West Stansbury Road on private 
property, particularly at the northern end of the Island near the Great Salt Lake. 
25. While there is conflicting testimony as whether there were any "No Trespassing" 
signs located along the West Stansbury Roadway and for what periods of time they were present, if 
there were any, they were located on private property beginning immediately after the first cattle 
guard at the beginning of Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, SLM, where the public lands 
end and private property begins, and the sign(s) did not prohibit use of the West Stansbury Road, but 
rather prohibited usage of the private property adjacent thereto. There was testimony that a "No 
Trespassing" sign was located immediately after the gate erected by the Bleazards at the beginning 
of private property on Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, SLM. A second sign was 
located two miles further down the road at the beginning of Zube Castagno's property. A third sign 
was approximately two additional miles down the road, at the beginning of Section 29, Township 
2 North, Range 6 West. 
26. Some historical private owners of the Island, treated the West Stansbury Road as a 
public road, and they did not restrict the public's use of the roadway nor did they throw individuals 
off of the roadway. 
27. Historical private owners of the Island differentiated between the public's use of the 
"public road" and trespass onto private property, and on occasion did ask people to leave the private 
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property adjoining the West Stansbury Road, and on occasion, when individuals were located 
shooting guns form the roadway itself onto private property, such individuals were also asked to 
leave. 
28. While there were a few occasions when individuals or groups asked permission to 
use the private land on the Island, and as such could conceivably be considered "permissive" users 
of the West Stansbury Road to obtain access to the private lands, usage of the road was 
overwhelmingly public usage, and not permissive. 
29. Over the years, cattle operations on the Island were conducted by the Bleazards and 
their progenitors, as well as leasing operations by the Castagnos and their progenitors. 
30. Ed Cassity, the progenitor of the Bleazards and owner of land on the Island, as well 
as other owners and stock raisers, differentiated between use of the road by the public and those who 
used guns around the cattle operations, either on the West Stansbury Road or on private property. 
31. On several occasions, people with guns were asked to leave private property on the 
Island where cattle were located and asked to go south onto public lands. 
32. As long as people were not hunting near cattle or taking weapons on private areas 
around cattle, the public was allowed to use the road for traveling and were not asked to leave the 
road. 
33. In addition to the general public who used the West Stansbury Road for recreational 
purposes, MagCorp, its predecessors and successor, and other commercial operations such as the 
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Brine Shrimp industry, construction companies, fuel hauling companies, Amoco Oil Company, salt 
extraction, and gravel hauling companies used the road for commercial purposes for many years, 
beginning at least in the 1960's. This included the use of commercial trucks, heavy haul trucks and 
the like. Several such operations continue to this day. 
34. Until 1993 when the County vacated its interest in the West Stansbury Road, there 
was no gate that prohibited access by the public for the use of the West Stansbury Road. 
35. After the County vacated the West Stansbury Road, the Bleazards acknowledged in 
a written access agreement dated October 12, 1996, between the Bleazards and the Cooks that 
"(i)ngress and egress to Grantee's Property has historically been provided by a Tooele County Road 
situated on the west side of Stansbury Island, in Tooele County, Utah." 
36. Beginning in approximately 1984 the use of the West Stansbury Road by the public 
increased dramatically, and Defendants Bleazard had law enforcement agencies issue citations to 
trespassers on private property on the Island. 
37. Despite the issuance of citations, vandalism to private property on the Island 
associated with the public use of the road continued. The Bleazards, Tooele County and the BLM 
initiated a signage program that notified users of the West Stansbury Road that, although the road 
was public, the ground on either side of the road was not. This approach to the trespassing problem 
was a compromise agreed upon by the parties to try to address the public access issues. 
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38. Although the Bleazards disagreed with the wording that the road was public, they 
agreed to try the signage as a way of discouraging damage to private property by users of the public 
road, but allowed the public to use the roadway. 
39. The signage program was unsuccessful, as people continued to use the West 
Stansbury Road to access the adjoining private property and vandalism continued. 
40. In 1993, the Bleazards petitioned the Tooele County Commission to vacate the 
County's interest, if any, in the West Stansbury Road, which petition was granted and an ordinance 
vacating that interest was enacted. 
41. In 1993, after the County vacated its interest in the West Stansbury Road, passage on 
the roadway was restricted by the Bleazards by use of a locked gate, which gate had not existed 
previously. A fence was also constructed along the south line of Section 16, Township 1 North, 
Range 6 West. 
42. Until 1993 when the Bleazards installed a locked gate, the public's use of the West 
Stansbury Road was physically unfettered and included the entire stretch of the road to the gate at 
the entrance of the MagCorp dike, since the dike was built. 
43. The public, commercial enterprises, and government employees had access to and 
used the West Stansbury Road to the MagCorp gate where a turn-around was available for 
individuals and the county graders. The County graded the road to the turn-around at the MagCorp 
gate. 
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44. The public, commercial businesses and government employees traveled the West 
Stansbury Road road up to and including the turn-around at the very north end of the Island at the 
MagCorp gate. Access to the Cable Gate Road and northern shore of the Island (southern shore of 
the Great Salt Lake) was gained by the public near the turn-around and gate. 
45 . The "South Road" intersects the West Stansbury Road in Section 16, Township 1 
North, Range 6 West, SLM, and heads east toward the mountains for approximately one mile long. 
It is an unimproved dirt road built by Ed Cassity. 
46. The South Road is located approximately three-quarters of a mile north of the gate 
installed by the Bleazards. 
47. The South Road crosses private property from the West Stansbury Road and provides 
access to BLM land on the eastern part of the Island. It was originally built by Ed Cassity to access 
lands he owned on the east side of the Island. 
48. Public members and governmental employees have used the South Road since its 
construction continuing to 1993 when the Bleazards installed the gate prohibiting access to the West 
Stansbury Road. 
49. While some evidence exists as to the public using the South Road, it appears sporadic 
and does not reflect a consistent and ongoing use for any ten year period. 
50. A "No Trespassing" sign was located to the side of the West Stansbury Road at the 
beginning of private property on Section 16, Township 1 North, Range 6 West, SLM . 
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51. The position of the No Trespassing sign in relation to the location of the South Road 
leads to the conclusion that the sign refers to the South Road as being private property. 
52. The South Road was not maintained by Tooele County or other commercial 
enterprise, nor was it designated as a Class B road, and the County did not receive any state funds 
for that road. 
53 Private landowners differentiated between public usage of the South Road and the 
West Stansbury Road, and public members were routinely asked to leave the South Road. 
54. The "Pass Canyon Road" intersects the West Stansbury Road in Section 20, 
Township 2 North, Range 6 West, SLM, and heads east toward the mountains for approximately 
three miles. This is an unimproved dirt road and was built by Ed Cassity during the period of his 
ownership of property on the Island to access his private lands on the east side of the Island. 
55. The Pass Canyon Road crosses private property from the West Stansbury Road and 
provides access to BLM land on the eastern part of the Island and private lands of the Bleazards.. 
56. Public members and governmental employees have used the Pass Canyon Road since 
its construction continuing to 1993 when the Bleazards installed the gate prohibiting access to the 
West Stansbury Road. 
57. There is no evidence that any "No Trespassing" sign was located adjacent to the Pass 
Canyon Road, but three previous "No Trespassing" signs placed to the side of the West Stansbury 
Road indicated that the property to the side of the road was private.. 
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58. The Pass Canyon Road was not maintained by Tooele County or other commercial 
enterprise, was not designated as a Class B road, and the County did not receive state funds for that 
road. 
59. Private landowners differentiated between public usage of the side roads and the West 
Stansbury Road, and public members were asked to leave the Pass Canyon Road by the owners. 
60. The "Cable Gate Road" intersects the West Stansbury Road on the northern end of 
the Island, in Section 16, Township 2 North, Range 6 West, where it heads north and then east 
around the northern part of the Island. It is an unimproved road, and is designated on the United 
States Geological Survey Maps as a "jeep trail." This road was also built by Ed Cassity during the 
period of his ownership to access his private lands on the east side of the Island. 
61. The Cable Gate Road apparently received its name because, for a portion of time in 
the early 1990's, its access was blocked by a cable stretched across the road. 
62. The Cable Gate Road crosses private property from the West Stansbury Road and 
provides access to BLM land along the northern part of the Island and to private property on the east 
side of the Island. 
63. The Cable Gate Road was not maintained by Tooele County or other commercial 
enterprise, was not designated a Class B road, and the County did not receive state funds for that 
road. 
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64. Private landowners differentiated between public usage of the side roads and the West 
Stansbury Road and public members were asked to leave the Cable Gate Road by the owner. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State's claim that a temporary public easement exists on the West Stansbury 
Road and the side roads is governed by Utah Code Ann. §72-5-203. 
2. In order to establish a temporary easement under Utah Code Ann. §72-5-203, the 
State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence, that the roads were (a) a highway, (b) that 
existed prior to January 1, 1992, which (c) terminates at or within or traverses state lands, and has 
(d) been constructed or maintained by a responsible authority. 
3. By its express language, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-203 asserts a temporary easement 
solely over State lands and does not apply to private lands. 
4. Utah Code Ann. §72-5-203 does not allow the State of Utah to cross by easement, 
even in a temporary way, private lands and, therefore, is inapplicable to this matter. 
5. Any order authorizing the State to have a temporary easement over private land under 
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-203 would constitute a taking of private property without compensation and 
is rejected. 
6. The cause of action asserting a temporary easement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 72-5-
203 should be dismissed as a matter of law. 
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7. The State, in its claim of a public easement over the West Stansbury Road and side 
roads, must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence, that these roads were used as a public 
thoroughfare continuously for a period often years. 
8. Continuous use need not be regular to be continuous, as even infrequent use can result 
in dedication of a road as a public thoroughfare. Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 809 
(UtahApp. 1998). 
9. Continuous use requires that the public be able to use the road whenever they found 
it necessary and convenient. 
10. In order for a user to be a permissive user of the roads, there needs to be some overt 
action on the part of a landowner to invite or allow users access to the roads. 
11. Allowing anyone and everyone to access the roads whenever and as often as they 
chose at their convenience is the very basis upon which public dedication is founded and does not 
constitute permissive use. 
12. Whatever limited "No Trespassing" signs may have existed on the West Stansbury 
Road did not refer to the roadway itself, and the actions of the owners from 1949 to the time the road 
was closed in 1993 clearly demonstrate that the owners, while unwilling to have their adjoining 
property used and abused in various ways, understood, accepted and acknowledged the West 
Stansbury Road as a public thoroughfare. 
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13. There is clear and convincing evidence that the West Stansbury Road was in 
continuous use by the public as a public thoroughfare for a period often years or more, from 1949 
through 1992. The West Stansbury Road during this time was open to all who desired to use it, and 
it was used by the public for a variety of purposes, all without restriction or prohibition, as the public 
found it necessary and convenient. 
14. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104, the State is entitled to a public easement on 
the West Stansbury Road that traverses the entire road to the gate and turn-around at the north end 
of the road. 
15. The State and the public are entitled to an easement the scope of the use of the road 
as historically established. 
16. The historical use of the road has been for commercial trucks, heavy hauling and 
vehicles of all nature for recreational purposes, thereby necessitating an easement the size of the 
currently existing road as of the date of this order. 
17. The owners, while not erecting barriers to access, erected "No Trespassing" signs to 
prohibit usage of the property adjoining the West Stansbury Road, including each of the three side 
roads. The public was routinely asked by the owners to leave property other than the West Stansbury 
Road, including each of the three side roads and the adjoining property, through the forty-five year 
time frame involved herein, all of which defeats any claim for a public easement of the side roads 
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18. The Court concludes that the State failed to produce clear and convincing evidence 
to demonstrate that the side roads were used continuously by the public as a public thoroughfare over 
a ten year period of time. 
19. The Court should enter an order denying the State's claim for a public easement of 
the three side roads. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
1. The State's claim for a temporary easement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-201 
is dismissed. 
2. A public easement for the West Stansbury Road up to the gate at the dike on the north 
end of the road is granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104, immediately upon the signing of 
this Order. 
3. The easement for the West Stansbury Road includes the existing road at the time of 
this order with all road drainage ditches, back and front slopes, turnouts, and other areas that 
facilitate use of the road by the public and which are necessary for the maintenance of said road. 
4. The gate that has been placed on said road by the Defendants shall be removed by 
October 3, 2004, and the road shall remain open for public use. 
5. The South Road, Pass Canyon Road, and Cable Gate Road are not subject to a public 
easement. 
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6. Each party is to bear its own attorney's fees and costs in this matter. 
SO ORDERED this "J^ day of September, 2004. 
RANDALL N. SKANC 
District Court Judge 
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ADDENDUM 2 
(Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1)) 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) 
(1) A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use of 
the public when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period often years. 
ADDENDUM 3 
(Map of Stansbury Island showing three side roads: 
South Road, Pass Canyon Road, and Cable Gate Road) 
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ADDENDUM 4 
(1959 Aerial Photograph of Stansbury Island) 
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(Map showing Cook-owned property on Stansbury Island) 
Property owned by R. Cook, Delbert Cook, E. Cook, 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, By and Through DIVISION OF 
FORESTRY, FIRE & STATE LANDS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TOOELE COUNTY, Utah; Six Mile Ranch 
Company; Craig S. Bleazard; Mark C. 
Bleazard; and John C. Bleazard, Defendants and 
Appellees. 
No. 20000493. 
Jan. 18, 2002. 
Rehearing Denied March 12, 2002. 
State brought action against county and landowners, 
challenging validity of ordinance that vacated county's 
interest in a road. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, David S. Young. J., ordered summary 
judgment against state, and it appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Russon, Associate C.J., held that genuine issue 
of material fact existed as to whether state's land 
abutted county road, precluding summary judgment 
against state on its claim that road vacation was void 
on ground that it was an abutting landowner and did 
not receive mailed notice of the proposal to vacate. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
HI Appeal and Error €=>1107 
30kl 107 Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court applies the law as it existed at the time 
of the violation charged. 
Ill Appeal and Error €=^842(2) 
30k842(2) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, Supreme 
Court affords no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law; those conclusions are reviewed for 
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correctness. Rules Civ.Proc.. Rule 56(c). 
131 Appeal and Error €=>842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
District Court's interpretation of a statutory provision 
is a question of law that the Supreme Court reviews for 
correctness. 
Ml Statutes €=>181(1) 
361kl8Kl) Most Cited Cases 
HI Statutes €=>184 
361kl84 Most Cited Cases 
When interpreting statutes, a court's primary goal is to 
evince the true intent and purpose of the legislature. 
151 Statutes €=>188 
36 Ik 188 Most Cited Cases 
To discern the legislature's intent and purpose in 
enacting a statute, courts look first to the best evidence 
of a statute's meaning, i.e., the plain language of the 
act. 
161 Statutes €=>206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
M Statutes €=^212.6 
361k212.6 Most Cited Cases 
In reading the language of an act, a court seeks to 
render all parts of the statute relevant and meaningful, 
and it therefore presumes the legislature used each 
term advisedly and according to its ordinary meaning. 
121 Statutes €==>206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
Courts avoid statutory interpretations that will render 
portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. 
M Highways €=^77(3) 
200k77{3) Most Cited Cases 
Under 1993 statute governing notice that county must 
provide when vacating road, a county must provide 
both notice to the public through a newspaper 
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publication or through posting and notice to 
landowners directly affected by the proposal through 
the mail. U C A 1953. 27-12-102 4 (1993). 
121 Highways €>=^77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
Under 1993 statute governing notice that county must 
provide when vacating road, notice by posting is 
merely an alternative to notice by publication when 
publication is unavailable, while mailed notice to 
abutting landowners is required in all cases. 
U C A 1953, 27-12-102 4 (1993). 
1101 Statutes €=>200 
361k200 Most Cited Cases 
Although courts need not always consider punctuation 
to discern legislative intent, they should not arbitrarily 
ignore punctuation, but should give it due 
consideration and effect where it may be used as an aid 
to ascertain the legislature's purpose. 
[Ill Statutes €=>206 
361k206 Most Cited Cases 
A court has a fundamental duty to give effect to every 
provision of a statute. 
1121 Highways C=>77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
The 1993 statute stating that county must provide 
mailed notice of proposed road vacation to abutting 
landowners does not limit class of intended recipients 
to abutting landowners whose ownership is indicated 
on the rolls of the county assessor; rather, the 
provision directs counties to mail notice to all abutting 
landowners of record, using each respective 
landowner's contact information as listed on the county 
assessor's rolls to address the notices for mailing. 
U C A 1953, 27-12-102 4 (1993). 
1131 Public Lands C==>5 
317k5 Most Cited Cases 
When state sovereign lands are involved, notice of 
state's ownership by recording title with a designated 
government official is unnecessary because ownership 
of the property is vested in the state upon entrance into 
the union, and the state's designation of those lands in 
its constitution, statutes, or other means becomes the 
state's public record of its sovereign ownership. 
U C A 1953. 57-3-101(1). 
1141 Navigable Waters €=>36(1) 
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases 
Lands underlying navigable waters within a state 
belong to the state in its sovereign capacity. 
[151 Highways C=>77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
Under 1993 statute governing notice that county must 
provide when proposing to vacate road, a party 
qualifies as an "owner of record," as required to receive 
private mailed notice, if: (1) the party has recorded 
title to the land at issue with the county recorder, or (2) 
the land at issue is state sovereign land and is 
designated as such by public record. U C A 1953. 
27-12-102 4(1993). 
[161 Highways €=>77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
Under 1993 statute stating that county must provide 
mailed notice to abutting landowners of a proposed 
road vacation, land that joins, borders, or bounds a 
county road proposed to be vacated, with nothing 
intervening, is considered to be land that "abuts" the 
county road. U C A 1953. 27-12-102 4 (1993). 
[171 Highways €=>77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
Under notice statute in effect in 1993, a county's 
failure to provide the requisite notice of a proposal to 
vacate a road renders the subsequent vacation a nullity. 
U C A 1953. 27-12-102 4 (1993). 
[181 Highways €=>77(3) 
200k77(3) Most Cited Cases 
Under 1993 statute governing notice that county must 
provide when proposing to vacate road, state was an 
"owner of record," as required for it to receive mailed 
notice; land at issue was sovereign land that was below 
the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, which was a 
navigable body of water. U C A 1 9 5 3 , 27-12-102 4 
(1993). 
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[191 Navigable Waters C=>36(1) 
270k36(l) Most Cited Cases 
The "equal footing principle" accords newly admitted 
states the same property interests in submerged lands 
as was enjoyed by the thirteen original states as 
successors to the British Crown. 
1201 Judgment 0=^181(15.1) 
228kl81(15.1) Most Cited Cases 
Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
state's land abutted county road, precluding summary 
judgment against state on its claim that county's road 
vacation was void on ground that it was an abutting 
landowner and did not receive mailed notice of the 
proposal to vacate. U.CA.1953. 27-12-102.4 (1993). 
*682 Mark L. Shurtleff. Atfy Gen., Annina M 
Mitchell Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Douglas J. Ahlstronu Tooele, and George S. Young, 
Brent A. Bohman. Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
RUSSON. Associate Chief Justice. 
**1 The State of Utah, by and through its Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, appeals from a 
summary judgment order upholding Tooele County's 
vacation of its interests in a portion of West Stansbury 
Road near the Great Salt Lake. We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 In March 1993, following repeated vandalism to 
their respective properties on Stansbury Island. [FN 11 
landowners Six Mile Ranch Company, Craig S. 
Bleazard, John C. Bleazard, and Mark C. Bleazard 
(collectively, "the Bleazards") petitioned Tooele 
County ("the County") to vacate its interests in the 
northern portion of the main access road to the area, 
West Stansbury Road. Subsequently, the County 
published notice of the Bleazards' petition to vacate 
West Stansbury Road in the local newspaper, the 
Tooele Transcript-Bulletin. This notice, which 
appeared in the Transcript-Bulletin once a *683 week 
from May 18 to June 8,1993, stated in pertinent part: 
FN1. Stansbury Island is located at the 
southwest edge of the Great Salt Lake. Due to 
the lake's changing water levels, however, 
this "island" is currently a peninsula. In fact, 
"[t]here have been wide fluctuations of the 
elevation of the lake since it was first 
surveyed in 1850." Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. 
Hardy Salt Co., 26 Utah 2d 143. 145. 486 
P.2d 391. 392 (1971). 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Tooele 
County Commission will conduct a public hearing 
[on] June 15, 1993, ... concerning a proposal to 
vacate approximately eight (8) miles of the northerly 
portion of the Tooele County road located along the 
West side of Stansbury Island. A petition from 
landowners whose property adjoins the majority of 
this County road was filed with Tooele County 
asking that this road be vacated. One land owner in 
the same area is not included in the petition for 
vacation and, therefore, the Tooele County 
Commission, pursuant to its own order, has included 
the remainder of the County road running through 
these properties for consideration to be vacated. 
The legal description of the County road considered 
for vacation is as follows: 
Commencing along the South line of Section 16, 
Township 1 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and continuing North through 
Sections 6, 9, 4 and 5 of the said Township and 
Range; and thence running through Sections 32,29, 
20, 21, 16 and 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
In addition to its notice in the Transcript-Bulletin, the 
County mailed written notice of the proposal to various 
property owners with land abutting West Stansbury 
Road, but it did not send written notice to the State of 
Utah ("the State"). 
**3 Shortly thereafter, on June 15,1993, the County 
held a public hearing concerning the Bleazards' 
petition. Approximately one month later, on August 
17, 1993, the County enacted by a two-to-one vote 
Tooele County Ordinance 93-9, vacating the County's 
interest in West Stansbury Road pursuant to the 
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description of the road published in the County's prior 
notice. 
HI **4 On June 11, 1999, the State filed suit in the 
Third District Court for Tooele County challenging the 
validity of Ordinance 93-9 pursuant to sections 
27-12-102.3 and -102.4 of the Utah Code. Specifically, 
the State alleged that in adopting the ordinance, the 
County did not adhere to the notice requirements of 
section 27-12-102.4 because it did not mail the State 
written notice of the proposed vacation. At the time 
the County adopted Ordinance 93-9,JFN2] section 
27-12-102.4 provided: 
FN2. In 1998, the legislature amended and 
recodified section 27- 12-102.4 as section 
72-3-108 of the Utah Code. See Utah Code 
Ann. $ 72-3-108 (Supp.1999). Then, in 
2000, the legislature amended section 
72-3-108 to its current version. See Utah 
Code Ann. g 72-3-108 (Supp.200n. 
However, "we apply the law as it existed at 
the time of the violation charged," and we 
thus apply section 27-12-102.4 in this case as 
it existed in 1993. Featherstone v. Schaerrer, 
2001 UT 86. n. 2. 34 P.3d 194: see also 
Airport Hilton Ventures, Ltd. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm% 1999 UT 26. n. 1, 976 P.2d 
1197. 
No county road shall be ... vacated [pursuant to a 
landowner petition], unless notice of the pendency of 
the petition... be given by publishing in a newspaper 
published or of general circulation in such county 
once a week for four consecutive weeks preceding 
action on such petition or intention, or, where no 
newspaper is published in the county by posting the 
notice in three public places therein for four 
consecutive weeks preceding such petition, and by 
mailing such notice to all owners of record of land 
abutting the county road proposed to be vacated 
addressed to the mailing addresses appearing on the 
rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein 
said land is located. 
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-102.4 (Supp.1993). The 
State argued that it was entitled to notice under this 
provision because West Stansbury Road crossed and 
abutted sovereign lands located below the meander line 
(FN31 of the Great Salt Lake, lands owned by the 
State since 1896 in conjunction with Utah's entry into 
the Union. See, e.g., *684Utahv. United States, 403 
U.S. 9. 12- 13. 91 S.Ct. 1775. 29 L.Ed.2d 279 (1971). 
FN3. A meander line is a "survey line ... on a 
portion of land, usu [ally] following the 
course of a river or stream." Black's Law 
Dictionary 995 (7th ed. 1999). Apparently, 
the meander line of the Great Salt Lake was 
surveyed in various segments between 1855 
and 1966. Great Salt Lake Planning Team, 
Utah Dep't of Natural Resources, Great Salt 
Lake Comprehensive Management Plan and 
Decision Document 10 (2000). 
**5 Subsequently, on September 3, 1999, the State 
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the 
County had not complied with section 27-12- 102.4's 
notice requirements. According to the State, section 
27-12-102.4 required the County "to give notice by 
mail to abutting landowners in addition to publication 
in a newspaper or posting in three conspicuous places," 
and the County's failure to provide mailed notice 
rendered its vacation of the road null and void. In 
response, the County argued that the State was not 
entitled to mailed notice under section 27-12-102.4 
because, according to the County, the State did not 
"appear [as an owner of record] on the rolls of the 
county assessor" and was not "an owner of record of 
land abutting the road to be vacated." 
**6 On December 15, 1999, the Bleazards filed a 
cross-motion for summaiy judgment. In their motion, 
the Bleazards contended, among other things, that the 
County's failure to mail the State notice of its proposal 
to vacate West Stansbury Road was not fatal to 
Ordinance 93-9 because section 27-12-102.4 "only 
require[d] written notice when notice by publication is 
not available." The Bleazards further argued that the 
State "was not a landowner listed on the rolls of the 
County assessor," and thus, section 27-12-102.4 did 
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not require the County to mail the State notice of the 
proposed vacation. Finally, the Bleazards asserted 
that even if section 27-12-102.4 required counties to 
provide mailed notice in addition to notice by 
publication, the State was not entitled to mailed notice 
because the County's interests in West Stansbury Road 
"terminate[d] nearly [one] half mile from the nearest 
sovereign land." 
**7 Following the parties' respective motions for 
summary judgment, the district court conducted a 
hearing to consider whether the County's failure to 
mail the State notice of the proposed vacation of West 
Stansbury Road was improper. At the conclusion of 
the hearing, the court found that although "a question 
of fact [existed] as to whether the road [reached] to the 
meander line ... and whether the State [was] an 
abutting landowner" of the road, the County had 
complied with section 27-12-102.4 because publishing 
notice in the Transcript Bulletin was "sufficient" under 
the statute. Accordingly, the court entered summary 
judgment in favor of the County and the Bleazards in 
an order dated May 8, 2000. Interpreting section 
27-12-102.4 to require either (1) notice by publication 
or (2) notice by posting and mailing, the court ruled: 
"fSectionl 27-12-102.4 did not require that written 
notice be provided to the abutting landowners when 
notice by publication has been made [.]" The court 
further held that even if section 27-12-102.4 mandated 
mailed written notice, the County was not required to 
send such notice to the State because "it was not an 
abutting property owner on the rolls of the Tooele 
County Assessor." The State now appeals the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tooele 
County and the Bleazards. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[21 [31 **8 Summary judgment is proper only when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also, e.g., Wilcox v. 
Geneva Rock Cory., 911 P.2d 367. 368 (Utah 1996). 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we afford 
"no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law: 
those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634. 
636 (Utah 1989); see also, e.g., Dair\> Prod. Sen>s., 
Inc. v. City ofWelLwille, 2000 UT 81.1! 15. 13 P.3d 
581. Likewise, a district court's interpretation of a 
statutory provision is a question of law that we review 
for correctness. Bearden v. Croft 2001 UT 76. II5. 31 
P.3d 537; see also, e.g., Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518. 519 (Utah 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
**9 On appeal, the State raises two issues. First, the 
State argues that the district court erroneously 
interpreted section 27-12-102.4 of the Utah Code by 
(1) construing the provision as requiring counties to 
send abutting landowners mailed notice of a proposed 
road vacation only when notice by publication is *685 
not available, and by (2) reading the provision as 
requiring counties to send mailed notice to parties who 
own abutting land only if that ownership is recorded 
on the rolls of the county assessor. Second, the State 
contends that the court erred by refusing to grant 
summary judgment in the State's favor because, under 
a proper interpretation of section 27- 12-102.4, 
counties are required to provide abutting landowners 
mailed notice of a proposed vacation, and the County 
failed to serve the State with such notice. We address 
each issue in turn. 
I. MAILED NOTICE 
[41[51f61[71 **10 When interpreting statutes, our 
primary goal is to evince "the true intent and purpose 
of the Legislature." Jensen v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903. 906 (Utah 1984). To 
discern the legislature's intent and purpose, we look 
first to the "best evidence" of a statute's meaning, the 
plain language of the act. Id.; see also, e.g., City of 
Hildale v. Cooke, 2001 UT 56. % 36. 28 P.3d 697; 
Hall v. Utah State Dep't ofCorr., 2001 UT 34. f 15. 
24 P.3d 958. In reading the language of an act, 
moreover, we seek "to render all parts [of the statute] 
relevant and meaningful," Millett v. Clark Clinic 
Corp., 609 P.2d 934. 936 (Utah 1980). and we 
therefore "presume the legislature use[d] each term 
advisedly and ... according to its ordinary meaning." 
Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872. 875 (Utah 
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1995). Consequently, we "avoid interpretations that 
will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative." Hall. 2001 UT 34 at If 15. 24 P.3d 958: 
see also, e.g., Plaits v. Parents Helving Parents, 947 
P.2d 658. 662 (Utah 1997). 
**11 In the case now before us, two statutory 
provisions are relevant to the question of the 
legislature's intent regarding what notice a county 
must provide abutting landowners when vacating its 
interests in a county road. At the time Tooele County 
enacted Ordinance 93-9, a county could vacate its 
interests in a road under Utah law if "the county 
legislative body ... upon hearing [determined] that 
there [was] good cause for such ... vacation ..., that it 
[would] not be detrimental to the general interest, and 
that it should be made." Utah Code Ann. § 
27-12-102.1. Before convening such a hearing, 
however, the county was required to provide notice to 
abutting landowners in all but one circumstance. The 
statute stated: 
Notice of the intention of the county legislative body 
to vacate any county road, or part thereof, shall in all 
cases be given... except when there is filed with the 
county legislative body written consent to such 
vacation by the owners of the property abutting the 
part of the county road proposed to be vacated, in 
which case such notice shall not be required. 
Id. §27-12-102.3. The legislature likewise specified 
in detail the content of, form of service for, and class 
of recipients to which a county's notice of a proposed 
vacation should be sent. Section 27-12-102.4 
mandated that the county provide "notice of the 
pendency of the petition [for vacation] and the date of 
the hearing thereon," and that such notice 
be given by publishing in a newspaper published or 
of general circulation in such county once a week for 
four consecutive weeks preceding action on such 
petition or intention, or, where no newspaper is 
published in the county by posting the notice in three 
public places therein for four consecutive weeks 
preceding such petition, and by mailing such notice 
to all owners of record of land abutting the county 
road proposed to be vacated addressed to the mailing 
addresses appearing on the rolls of the county 
assessor of the county wherein said land is located. 
Id. § 27-12-102.4. 
**12 The State asserts that the district court should 
not have granted summary judgment to the County and 
the Bleazards under section 27-12-102.4 because it did 
so on the basis of an incorrect interpretation of Utah's 
road abandonment statute. Specifically, the State 
argues that the court erred by construing section 
27-12-102.4 as requiring mailed notice only when 
notice by publication is not available, and then only to 
abutting landowners whose ownership is recorded on 
the rolls of the county assessor. We agree that the 
district court incorrectly interpreted section 
27-12-102.4 in both instances. 
*686 A Form of Service 
f81f91fl01 **13 The plain language of section 
27-12-102.4 is unambiguous in regard to the form of 
service mandated by the provision's notice 
requirement. The section clearly indicates that a 
county proposing to vacate its interests in a road must 
provide both notice to the public through a newspaper 
publication or through posting and notice to 
landowners directly affected by the proposal through 
the mail. In pertinent part, the section states that 
notice shall be given 
by publishing in a newspaper ...., or, where no 
newspaper is published ... by posting the notice in 
three public places..., and by mailing such notice to 
all owners of record.... 
Id. g 27-12-102.4. An application of "elementary 
rules of punctuation and grammar" further bolsters this 
reading of section 27-12-102.4. Newspaper Agency 
Corp. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State TaxComm'n, 938 
P.2d 266.271 (Utah 1997). Although courts need not 
always consider punctuation to discern legislative 
intent, courts should not "arbitrarily ignore 
punctuation, but [should] give it due consideration and 
effect" where it may be used as an aid to ascertain the 
legislature's purpose. Bd. of Educ. v. Hanchett, 50 
Utah 289. 293. 167 P. 686. 687 (1917): see also, e.g., 
Elliot Coal Mining Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers' 
Corny. Programs, 17 F.3d 616. 629-30 (3d Cir.1994) 
("[TJhe presence of a comma before the last clause in 
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the statute suggests that the limiting clause applies to 
the entire series."). Here, the legislature's inclusion of 
commas both before and after the phrase "where no 
newspaper is published ... by posting the notice in 
three public places" serves to separate that clause from 
the preceding notice by publication and the subsequent 
notice by mail clauses. Utah Code Ann. § 
27-12-102.4. In doing so, the legislature has set the 
notice by posting clause apart from the others, and 
thus, clarified that notice by posting is merely an 
alternative to notice by publication when publication is 
unavailable, while mailed notice is required in all 
cases. 
[Ill **14 Indeed, construing section 27-12-102.4 as 
allowing either notice by publication or notice by 
posting and notice by mail would nullify one statutory 
provision at the expense of preserving, at best, an 
alternate reading of another. Section 27-12-102.3 of 
the road abandonment statute exempts counties from 
the requirements of section 27-12-102.4 under the 
narrow circumstance where the landowners abutting 
the road proposed to be vacated unanimously consent 
in writing to the vacation. Id § 27-12- 102.3. If 
section 27-12-102.4 were construed as not requiring 
counties to mail notice to abutting landowners, 
however, the consent exemption of section 27-12-102.3 
would become superfluous, since a county could vacate 
its interests in a road without ever specifically noticing 
those abutting landowners. Not only would such a 
construction place undue—and legislatively 
unanticipated-faith in the ability of the smallest of 
notices in a region's newspaper to reach the widest of 
audiences, but it would violate our "fundamental duty" 
to give effect to every provision of a statute. Madsen 
v. Borthwh 769 P.2d 245. 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988); see 
also Hall 2001 UT 34 at T\ 15. 18. 24 P.3d 958; 
Platts, 947 P.2d at 662. 
**15 Accordingly, we hold that the district court 
erred by ruling section 27-12-102.4 "did not require 
that written notice be provided to the abutting 
landowners" because the County had published notice 
in the Transcript-Bulletin, Rather, at the time the 
County proposed to vacate West Stansbury Road, the 
statute clearly required that counties provide both (1) 
public notice through publication or posting and (2) 
private notice via mail to abutting landowners. 
5. Class of Recipients 
**16 Having determined that mailed notice is 
required under section 27- 12-102.4 regardless of 
whether a county publishes notice, we now turn to the 
question of to whom the County was required to 
provide mailed notice in this case. In its order 
granting summary judgment to the County and the 
Bleazards, the district court held that the County was 
not required to send mailed notice to the State because 
section 27-12-102.4 mandated mailed notice only to 
abutting landowners whose ownership was indicated 
on the county assessor's rolls, and the State *687 "was 
not an abutting property owner on the rolls of the 
Tooele County Assessor." 
£121 **17 Contrary to the district court's 
interpretation, however, section 27-12-102.4's mailed 
notice provision does not limit its class of intended 
recipients to abutting landowners whose ownership is 
indicated on the rolls of the county assessor. Rather, 
the provision directs counties to mail notice to all 
abutting landowners of record, using each respective 
landowner's contact information as listed on the county 
assessor's rolls to address the notices for mailing. The 
provision states; 
No county road shall be ... vacated, unless notice of 
the pendency of the petition ... be given ... by 
mailing such notice to all owners of record of land 
abutting the county road proposed to be vacated 
addressed to the mailing addresses appearing on the 
rolls of the county assessor of the county wherein 
the land is located. 
Utah Code Ann. ? 27-12-102.4 (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is clear from the plain language of the statute 
that the district court erred by limiting section 
27-12-102.4's mailed notice requirement to abutting 
landowners whose contact information is listed "on the 
rolls of the county assessor." Id. The terms "on the 
rolls of the county assessor" comprise only one part of 
the larger clause "addressed to the mailing addresses 
appearing on the rolls of the county assessor," and that 
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clause indicates the place to which such notices should 
be sent without restricting in any way the scope of the 
parties that shall be noticed. Id. 
**18 Consequently, the relevant inquiry becomes not 
whether a landowner's contact information is listed on 
the rolls of the county assessor, but whether the 
landowner qualifies as a member of the class to which 
the county is required to provide mailed notice. To 
determine the parameters of this class, we again turn 
to the plain language of section 27-12-102.4, which, as 
noted, requires that mailed notice be given "to all 
owners of record of land abutting the county road 
proposed to be vacated." Id. Thus, a county intending 
to vacate its interests in a road must send mailed notice 
to parties that satisfy two conditions, i.e., to parties 
who are (1) "owners of record" of land that (2) "abut[s] 
the county road proposed to be vacated." Id. To assess 
whether a given landowner satisfies these conditions, 
however, we must first construe each term "according 
to its ordinary and accepted meaning." Nelson v. Salt 
Lake County, 905 F.2d 872. 875 (Utah 1995); see 
also, e.g., Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs., Inc., 
2001 UT 29.1i 12. 24 P.3d 928: loll & Branch, P. C v. 
Asav, 932 P.2d 592. 594 (Utah 1997). 
1. "Owners of Record" 
F13iri4iri51 **19 "Owner of record" is a legal term 
that denotes a "property owner in whose name the title 
appears in the public records." Black's Law Dictionary 
1131 (7th ed. 1999). Under most circumstances, such 
records are located in the place designated by the 
applicable recording act. In Utah, for instance, 
landowners record title to their property "in the office 
of the recorder of the county where the real property is 
located," Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-101(1) (2000). and 
this act of recording serves the purpose of "imparling] 
notice to all persons" of the owner's interest in the 
property. Id. $57-3-101. Where state sovereign lands 
are involved, however, notice by recording with a 
designated government official is unnecessary because 
ownership of the property is vested in the state upon 
entrance into the Union, and the state's designation of 
those lands in its constitution, statutes, or otherwise 
therefore becomes the state's "public record" of its 
sovereign ownership. DFN41 As the *688 United States 
Supreme Court has stated, "It is settled law in this 
country that lands underlying navigable waters within 
a state belong to the State in its sovereign capacity...." 
United States v. Holt State Bank 270 U.S. 49. 54. 46 
S.Ct. 197.70 L.Ed. 465 (1926). Consequently, a party 
qualifies as an "owner of record" under section 
27-12-102.4 of the Utah Code if (1) the party has 
recorded title to the land at issue with the county 
recorder, or if (2) the land at issue is state sovereign 
land and is designated as such by public record. 
FN4. Moreover, we note that requiring the 
State to record title to its sovereign lands with 
a county recorder pursuant to section 
57-3-101 would lead to truly absurd results, 
since, unlike properties it purchases or takes 
from other landowners, the State assumes 
ownership of these lands in its capacity as 
sovereign and thus never receives written title 
to the lands. Therefore, although the State 
clearly owns its sovereign lands, it simply has 
no written title of the lands to record with a 
county recorder. See State v. Redd, 1999 UT 
108. % 12. 992 P.2d 986 ("Our clear 
preference is the reading that reflects sound 
public policy, as we presume that must be 
what the legislature intended. In other 
words, we interpret a statute to avoid absurd 
consequences." (citation omitted)); see also, 
e.g., AltaIndus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846P.2d 1282. 
1292 & n. 24 (Utah 1993); Schurtzv.BMW 
ofN. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108. 1113 (Utah 
1991); Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 
P.2d 1037. 1045 n. 39 (Utah 1991). 
2. "Land Abutting the County Road Proposed To Be 
Vacated" 
[161 **20 Like "owner of record," the word "abut" is 
a term commonly used in the context of property law. 
In its most ordinary sense, the term is employed to 
describe properties that "join at a border or boundary." 
Black's Law Dictionary 10 (7th ed.1999). For 
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example, in Farnsworth v. Soter's, Inc., we observed: 
" '[A]buf ... 'conveys the idea of bordering on, [or] 
bounded by, with nothing intervening.'" 24 Utah 2d 
199. 200. 468 P.2d 372. 373 (1970) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis omitted); see also 1 C.J.S. Abut (1985). 
Accordingly, land that joins, borders, or bounds a 
county road proposed to be vacated, with nothing 
intervening, is considered to be land that "abut[s] the 
county road" under section 27-12-102.4. 
II. FAILURE TO PROVIDE MAILED NOTICE 
**21 Because section 27-12-102.4 requires counties 
to provide mailed notice "to all owners of record of 
land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated," 
we now examine the State's second claim on appeal: 
that the district court erred by refusing to grant 
summary judgment in the State's favor because the 
County failed to send the State mailed notice of the 
proposed vacation of West Stansbury Road. 
[171 **22 As a preliminary matter, we note that the 
County concedes on appeal that it "did not mail notice 
to the State of Utah." Moreover, because notice is 
required under section 27-12-102.4 to ensure that a 
"county legislative body" considering a road vacation 
receives a full opportunity to receive comment on 
whether a proposed vacation "will not be detrimental 
to the general interest," Utah Code Ann. § 
27-12-102.1, failure to provide the required notice 
under section 27-12-102.4 renders a county's vacation 
of its interests in a road "a nullity." Ercanbrack v. 
Judd 524 P.2d 595. 597 (Utah 1974): see also 
Henderson v. Oseuthorpe, 657 P,2d 1268. 1270 (Utah 
1982) (stating that "even where a substantial period of 
nonuse of a public roadway has elapsed, no vacation 
occurs unless the specific statutory requirements of 
[sections! 27-12-102.1 to -102.4 are met"). 
Consequently, whether the district court erred by 
refusing to grant summary judgment in the State's 
favor turns solely on whether the State qualified as a 
member of the class to which the County was required 
to provide such notice, specifically, as an "owner of 
record" of land that "abutted" West Stansbury Road. 
[1811191 **23 In this case, it is clear that the State 
qualifies as an "owner of record" for the purposes of 
receiving mailed notice under Utah's road vacation 
statute. Under section 27-12-102.4, an "owner of 
record" is a landowner that either has recorded title 
with the recorder of the county where the property is 
located or owns the property as a sovereign with the 
property designated as such by public record. See 
supra f^ 19. Here, the land at issue is sovereign land 
that lies below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. 
Fee title to this land became vested in the State in its 
sovereign capacity when Utah entered the Union in 
1896, a fact reflected in article XX of the Utah 
Constitution, codified in the State's statutes since 1898, 
and reaffirmed by the United States Supreme Court 
under the equal footing doctrine [FN51 in *689 1971. 
[FN61 The most recent version of the relevant section 
of the Utah Code, which was in effect at the time the 
County adopted Ordinance 93-9, likewise defines 
"sovereign lands" as including "those lands lying 
below the ordinary high water mark of navigable 
bodies of water at the date of statehood and owned by 
the state by virtue of its sovereignty." Utah Code Ann. 
? 65A-1-K5) (2000). Indeed, in Utah State Road 
Commission v. Hardy Salt Co., we stated: 
FN5. "[T]he 'equal footing' principle 
[accords] newly admitted States the same 
property interests in submerged lands as was 
enjoyed by the Thirteen Original States as 
successors to the British Crown." Utah v. 
United States. 403 U.S. 9. 10. 91 S.Ct. 1775. 
29LJEd.2d279(1971). 
FN6. See Utah Const, art. XX ("All lands of 
the State that have been ... acquired ... are 
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public 
lands of the State...."); 1927 Utah Laws 9, § 
1 ("[T]he beds of all ... streams and lakes 
which at the time of said admission of Utah 
into the Union were navigable in fact... has 
at all times thereafter been and now is vested 
in the State of Utah."); Utah Rev. Stat. § 
62-1-2325 (1898) (giving state board of land 
commissioners control of "all lands heretofore 
... granted to this state by the government"); 
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Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9. 12-13. 91 
S.Ct. 1775. 29 L.Ed.2d 279 (1971) (holding 
that lands below the meander line of the 
Great Salt Lake were navigable in 1896, and 
thus, belong to Utah and not the United 
States); see also Utah v. United States, 420 
U.S. 304. 95 S.Ct. 1153. 43 L.Ed.2d 211 
(1975). 
We [hold] that [the] Great Salt Lake is a navigable 
body of water, and that the ownership of the lake bed 
became vested in the State of Utah at the time of its 
admission to the Union.... 
26 Utah 2d 143. 146-47. 486 P.2d 391. 393 (1971); 
see also State v. Rolio, 71 Utah 91. 107. 262 P. 987. 
993 (1927). Under these circumstances, neither the 
County nor the Bleazards have any claim that the State 
is not the owner of record of lands located below the 
meander line of the Great Salt Lake. It has been 
repeatedly adjudicated~both by this court and by the 
United States Supreme Court-that the State owns 
those lands as an ancillary to its entrance into the 
Union, and the State has continually made notice of 
such ownership as a matter of public record, namely, 
in its statutes and constitution. See Utah Const, art. 
XX; Utah Code Ann. § 65A-1-K5): 1927 Utah Laws 
9, § 1; Utah Rev. Stat. § 62-1-2325 (1898). Indeed, 
given that Utah's statutes have recognized sovereign 
ownership of lands below the meander line of the 
Great Salt Lake for over a hundred years, no legitimate 
argument can be made that the State's ownership of 
those lands was not a matter of public record in 1993. 
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 65A-1-K5): 1927 Utah 
Laws 9, § 1; Utah Rev. Stat. § 62-1-2325 (1898); see 
also Rolio, 71 Utah at 106-07. 262 P. at 992-93 
(describing the relevant statutory provisions' evolution 
from 1911 to 1927). Therefore, we hold that the State 
is the owner of record of lands located below the 
meander line of the Great Salt Lake for purposes of 
section 27-12-102.4. 
[201 **24 As a result, if the State's property located 
below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake abuts 
West Stansbury Road as described in the County's 
proposed vacation notice and subsequent enactment, 
then Ordinance 93- 9's vacation of the County's 
interests in the road is null and void. See Ercanbrack, 
524 P.2d at 597. In granting summary judgment, 
however, the district court did not rule on whether the 
State's land abutted the county road. Rather, the court 
found that "a question of fact [existed] as to whether 
the road even went to the meander line... and whether 
the State w[as] an abutting landowner," and then 
granted summary judgment in favor of the County and 
the Bleazards based upon its erroneous reading of 
section 27-12- 102.4 as not requiring mailed notice 
where a county has provided notice by publication. 
Accordingly, because the district court did not 
determine whether the State's property abutted West 
Stansbury Road, a disputed issue of material fact 
exists, and we therefore remand to the district court for 
a determination on this issue. See Lamb v. B & B 
Amusements Cory., 869 P.2d 926. 928 (Utah 1993) 
("The party moving for summary judgment must 
establish a right to judgment based on the applicable 
law as applied to an undisputed material issue of 
fact."); see also, e.g., K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 
P.2d 623. 628 (Utah 1994): Transamerica Cash 
Reser\*e, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 
24. 25 (Utah 1990); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). ITN71 
FN7. Despite the district court's finding that 
a disputed issue of material fact existed as to 
whether West Stansbury Road abuts the 
State's sovereign lands below the meander 
line, the Bleazards assert on appeal that the 
State is not an abutting landowner "as a 
matter of law." Specifically, the Bleazards 
contend that the portion of West Stansbury 
Road that crosses the meander line was never 
public and "is in fact a private easement 
leading to ... MagCorp['s] parcel and a 
private road across the MagCorp parcel to... 
the Great Salt Lake." In making this 
argument, however, the Bleazards neither 
challenge the district court's factual finding 
nor provide this court with adequate, 
judicially noticeable evidence to determine 
that the road does not abut the State's land as 
a matter of law. In fact, even the County's 
own proposed vacation notice, which 
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indicates that the County intended to vacate a 
road "running through" the survey section 
where MagCorp's land is located, suggests 
that it simply is not agreed whether the 
County's interests in West Stansbury Road 
continued to the meander line of the Great 
Salt Lake. Therefore, as explained above, we 
must remand the issue of abutment for farther 
proceedings before the district court. 
*690 **25 In determining on remand whether the 
State's sovereign lands abut West Stansbury Road, the 
district court shall apply the correct legal standard 
under section 27-12-102.4. Specifically, the court shall 
determine whether the State's land joins, borders, or 
bounds, with nothing intervening, West Stansbury 
Road as it is described in the County's proposed 
vacation notice and subsequent enactment of that 
proposal: 
Commencing along the South line of Section 16, 
Township 1 North, Range 6 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and continuing North through 
Sections 6, 9, 4 and 5 of the said Township and 
Range; and thence running through Sections 32,29, 
20, 21, 16 and 9 of Township 2 North, Range 6 
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
See Farnsworth v. Soter's, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 3 99. 200. 
468 P.2d 372. 373 (1970). If the district court 
determines that the State's land abuts West Stansbury 
Road as it is described in the County's proposed 
vacation notice, then the court must grant summary 
judgment in the State's favor, overturning Tooele 
County Ordinance 93-9 as null and void. See 
Ercanbrack, 524 P.2d at 597. If, conversely, the court 
determines that the State's land does not abut the road, 
then the court shall enter summary judgment in favor 
of the County and the Bleazards, allowing Ordinance 
93-9 to remain in effect. 
CONCLUSION 
**26 The district court erred by construing section 
27-12-102.4 of the Utah Code as requiring counties to 
provide mailed notice of a proposed road vacation only 
where notice by publication is not available, by ruling 
that mailed notice need be provided only to abutting 
landowners whose ownership is reflected on the rolls 
of the county assessor, and thus, by granting summary 
judgment in favor of Tooele County and the Bleazards. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's summary 
judgment order and remand for further proceedings in 
a manner consistent with this opinion. 
**27 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice DURHAM, Justice 
DURRANT, and Justice WILKIN S concur in Associate 
Chief Justice RUSSON'S opinion. 
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